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THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENRE:
A BURKEAN INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE
Thomas M. LessI
University of Georgia
Students of rhetoric have long recognized that the identification of genres
enables critics to describe not only the characteristic features of a particular
family of messages but also the life situations that bring such discourses into
existence.' The solemnity of hymns reflects the solemnity of the occasions
for which they are written. The defensive character of apologia has to be
measured against the climate of accusation that brings such speeches into
being. Eulogies are commemorative because they mark the passing of a hu
man life, and so forth.
When these messages are considered within the body of understandings
brought to rhetorical studies by Kenneth Burke, it becomes evident that gen
res may also reflect the kind of human identification that was called for in
the particular situation which gave rise to them.-' To the extent that we share
Burke's view of rhetoric as an activity devoted to bringing about cooperation,
it is also necessary to recognize that such messages create bonds of identity
among their audiences. Thus, for instance, while the primary goal of a na
tional political convention is the nomination of a candidate—a task requiring
persuasion—convention rhetoric must also accomplish the goals of identifi
cation. Although political speech couches such goals in the language of party
"unity," they clearly fall under the heading of rhetorical "identification." If
the members of each party are going to cooperate in promoting their can
didate, they must be united around a common set of goals. To the extent
that they are so united, it would be fair to say that those involved have "a
common identity." When a person is under the spell of such political rhetoric
he or she ceases, at least for the moment, to be an "I" and becomes a "we"
instead. The person is no longer "Sharon McNally, real estate agent from
Pittsburgh;" she is now a member of what is symbolically represented within
convention rhetoric as the "Republican Party." Her individual identity is
caught up in some collective self through the mediation of symbols.
In the more traditional language of Aristotelian rhetoric we would say that
such a person has been "persuaded" to accept the platform of the Repub
lican party. Burke's way of describing the same outcome would be to say
that the person has entered into an identity that is coextensive with that
platform. Burke's approach does not deny or contradict the Aristotelian un
derstanding of rhetoric; it merely offers a different take on it.^ It draws more
' This is implicit in Lloyd Bitzer's notion of rhetorical situations. "The Rhetorical
Situation," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 1 (1968): 1-14; For a more detailed discussion
of situational determinants of genre see Kathleen M. Hall Jamieson, "Generic Con
straints and the Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy and Rhetoric 6 (1973): 162-70.
^ Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of Motives (Cleveland:
Meridian Books, 1962) 544-47.
^ Burke 522; 579-589.
SPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 34, Nos. 1-4 (1997), 1-10.
5
et al.: Volume 34, Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, Fall 1996/Winter 1997/Spring 1997/
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato,
2  SPEAKER AND GAVEL
attention to the fact that persuasive outcomes are always social outcomes.
To be persuaded is to accept an identity, and identities never occur in a
vacuum but always in some larger context of other identities. Moreover, if
rhetoric is a study of the ways in which language brings about such states of
identification, it may be assumed that the linguistic features of a rhetorical
genre reflect some situation of needed identification.
This is how I would like to think about rhetorical genres at the moment.
Rhetorical artifacts are studied because, as surviving registers of human ac
tion, they afford the critic important insights into the events of human history.
In particular, rhetorical artifacts reveal something about how social identities
take form, how they are maintained, and how they are perpetuated. In light
of this an examination will be undertaken of the ways in which the notion
of genre itself may offer insight into the formation and maintenance of human
identities. To do so I would like to examine how this might occur in the three
rhetorical genres identified by Aristotle—his tripartite division of rhetoric into
deliberative, forensic, and epideictic genres. I will show how each of these
three classes of rhetoric represents a distinct kind of identification. To the
extent that these three genres are associated in their Aristotelian formulation
with particular oratorical forums and temporal foci, they have been demar
cated traditionally according to the persuasive goals that they accomplish.
Deliberative rhetoric occurs in legislative bodies and is oriented to the future
because of its concern with persuading political actors to follow policy di
rectives. Forensic rhetoric occurs in courtrooms and is oriented to the past
because of its concern with bringing judgment to pass upon some event that
has already transpired. The ceremonial situations in which epideictic occurs
orient listeners to the present because of this genre's devotion to affirming
the values that currently bond the community together.^
Rather than throwing out this traditional Aristotelian association between
rhetoric and persuasion, Kenneth Burke merely added "identification" to the
mix as an "accessory to the standard lore."^ In light of this alteration of the
traditional view, the critic may now want to consider what the identification
of a message's generic form discloses about the public selves that are artic
ulated in such instances of rhetoric.
In a Burkean mode of conceptualizing such rhetorical outcomes, we
would ask ourselves what forms or experiences of consubstantiality are likely
to arise from a message belonging to one of these three classes. Since Burke
denotes by the term "identification" the social bonds that are enacted within
speech,^ the application of this concept to genre theory requires some de
termination of the ways that each particular family of discourse accomplishes
such outcomes of social construction. In other words the critic must deter
mine what manner of identification is exhibited in a given message and how
a particular category of identification fits traditional understandings of the
Aristotelian genres.
The table below considers how Burke's notion of rhetoric might be sub-
" George A. Kennedy trans., Aristotle On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse
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divided into three categories of identification-each corresponding to one of
the three Aristotelian genres. The left column specifies three types of iden
tification that are likely to occur through discourse. The right hand identifies
the Aristotelian counterpart to each of these types.
Burke Aristotle
1. Identity of action Deliberative
2. Identity of context Forensic
3. Identity of being Epideictic
Just as there are different substances of persuasion that comprise the tradi
tional Aristotelian genres, we can also find within these generic categories,
three distinct substances of identification. In the next several pages, I will
explicate these categories of identification and then illustrate them through
an examination of three of Abraham Lincoln's speeches-each representing
one of the Aristotelian genres.
Deliberation's most conspicuous feature, as Aristotle recognized, is its con
cern with the future. Deliberation is about policy, that which needs to occur
in the future. As such it would not seem to be concerned with identity, at
least not on the surface. Its focal question is "where are we going?" rather
than "who are we?" But to the extent that individuals share a common view
of the future, they are also drawn together as a community acting to realize
that vision. Through such rhetoric they become a community that is defined
by its action. Deliberative rhetoric causes audiences to share not only a way
of seeing the world but also a way of seeing themselves as actors within that
world. Policy is action, and any characterization of action such as is given
in deliberative rhetoric always implies many things about the character of its
agents.
This can be shown to occur in the familiar debates of Congressional leg
islators about how to deal with the budget deficit. Such speakers typically
envision at least two views of the future. One is of a future shaped by in
action, in which the escalating deficit is not arrested and leads to some sort
of economic catastrophe. The other view is likely to be of economic salvation
assured by the adoption of more propitious fiscal practices.
So far as the identity-shaping power of these visions is concerned, it mat
ters not which view is taken. To participate in either is to accept a certain
identity as an actor. Each particular concept of the future is a vision of that
into which the audience enters when it gives its assent to what is said in a
discourse. To take such an imagined future to heart is to accept a definition
not only of these acts but of the agent that is implied by them. The audience
that assents to such proposed actions of "belt-tightening" is also accepting
itself as the agent of such actions. Thus when called upon to name them
selves, they will identify themselves as "economically responsible," or "fis
cally conservative." In doing so audiences are taking their substance as a
community from the actions described in discourse.
Something quite different turns up in forensic discourse. Aristotle identifies
forensics with the past and with the rhetorical environment of the courtroom.
Judicial tribunals, which are the most familiar arenas of forensic discourse,
have as their appointed duty the application of the law to particular events.
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To do this a court has to determine two things generally, the precise nature
of the events that are being examined according to the law, and the nature
or meaning of the law itself.
Although it is difficult enough to establish the truth of the particular facts
of a case, the work of establishing the reality of legal proscriptions, which
heretofore may have existed only on paper, is truly a daunting problem for
courts. Communities generally agree that human behavior must be regulated
by law, and yet the reality of the law is something that is characteristically
abstract, seemingly transitory, and subject to variable interpretations. One
would be hard pressed to find any person who does not value law, (at least
insofar as it is in his or her own interest), but to agree about what the basis
of law is or about how it should be applied is another matter.
For a democratic government the law becomes real in an official sense
when it is authorized by a deliberative body, but it is actualized in forensic
discourse. This is to say that it achieves its reality for those subject to it
through its enforcement in the courts. Forensic rhetoric brings what legisla
tive bodies have created into the real world of human affairs.
This goal is accomplished as a persuasive outcome of forensics in the
judgments that a court passes down. A court responds to forensic discourses
by deciding how the particular events it must consider should be interpreted
under the law. The identification that coincides with this is a common vision
of the reality of the law as the context in which the audience exists and acts.
This is to say that the acts which are judged in the courtroom are situated
within the law. In agreeing upon the relationship of the law to these events,
the audience for such messages comes to the conscious recognition that the
law is the shared context of their lives. Concrete experiences of ordinary life
are united in this fashion with the abstract reality of legal statutes, enabling
people to see themselves as living within a common environment of law.
Courtroom rhetoric is only the most technical variant of rhetoric that ac
complishes this identity of context. What judicial speech shares in common
with these other varieties of forensic discourse is an historical conscious
ness—identified by Aristotle as forensic's concern with the past.'
Common to all rhetorics relying upon an historical consciousness is the
effort to associate intangible things, such as ideas or policies, with tangible
events of the past. In the courtroom this occurs when abstract considerations
of law and justice are identified with human actions as they are woven into
narrative constructions of a case. In the political arena forensics is likewise
employed when an administration or party identifies its policies with the
seemingly indubitable reality of historical events. The Reagan and Bush ad
ministrations, for instance, identified the collapse of communism in Eastern
Europe with the foreign policies enunciated during their tenure in Washing
ton. In this case it was not so much causal reasoning that gave the Reagan
and Bush administrations credit for the demise of communism as it was the
sense of "presence" that their policies achieve by being associated with such
momentous events." The causal reasoning at work in such arguments would
' Kennedy 47-118.
® Chaim Perelman, The Realm of Rhetoric, trans. William Kluback (Notredame, IN:
U of Notredame P 1982) 33-40.
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not withstand close scrutiny, but it is made powerful by its ability to unite
the tangible fact of communism's demise in Eastern Europe with the abstract
political ideology of the Reagan administration. The audience which is per
suaded of this causal argument comes to share a common allegience to the
context of political ideology that such arguments visualize.
To round out Aristotle's three genres, we come finally to epideictic or
ceremonial rhetoric. While deliberation is forward looking and forensics
backward looking, epideictic looks at the present. It might be better to say—
though this is certainly not how Aristotle puts it—that epideictic is "inward"
looking. To focus upon the present is to take stock of oneself, and that is
precisely what seems to go on when people speak on ceremonial occasions.
This human focus is evidenced in what Aristotle identifies as the end or
aim of epideictic, which is "praise or blame."' The most familiar instances
of epideictic discourse in antiquity were encomia, speeches originally given
in praise of the gods and latter in praise of exemplary citizens." What the
religious and secular variants of the genre share in common is a tendency
to praise traits in their human or divine subjects which are identified with
the speaker's society as a whole.
As a form of persuasion epideictic succeeds when it manages to arouse
these evaluations of praise and blame. But as a form of identification it suc
ceeds when some desired understanding of the community's being is realized
within these evaluations. Aristotle regarded the present as the locus of this
genre, but he acknowledged the involvement of the other temporal perspec
tives as well. He observed that "all speakers praise or blame in regard to
existing qualities," but they also make "use of other things, both reminding
[the audience] of the past and projecting the course of the future."" Epi
deictic discourse situates the particular event that is its subject within a larger
stream of human occurrences, as if to make its audience see the past flowing
into the present and out again into the future. By looking at the full panorama
of time in this fashion, epideictic speeches attain a kind of timelessness. A
speech that sees some whole of time cannot be relativised in the same fash
ion as one that looks at only one dimension of time. It is for this reason that
epideictic speeches may remain relevant long after the events which inspired
them have passed. Thus while the Gettysburg Address is specifically about
the American Civil War, Lincoln situates this conflict within the full spectrum
of American history, both past and future. The readers of this speech always
find themselves in it. The contest described in his speech becomes the strug
gle for democracy that is occurring at every moment.
The identification which occurs in such messages complies with Burke's
notion of identification in the fullest sense. The focus of deliberation is upon
the action of policy, and thus the identification that arises from this genre is
centered outwardly in proposed actions. In forensics the focus is upon the
human environment, the common scene of community life. But the focus of
' Kennedy 48-9.
"T. C. Burgess, Epideictic Literature (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987; [1902
U of Chicago P]) 113-27.
" Kennedy 48.
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epideictic, which is upon praise and blame, turns an audience's attention
inward to contemplate the contours of some collective self.
This is not to say that epideictic is often about the corporate self in any
explicit sense. The attention of such rhetoric is more likely to be upon some
thing more specific, a particular person, place, or event. But these specifics
are always emblems of some shared identity.
A Critical Illustration: Three Speeches of Abraham Lincoln
The relationship between the Aristotelian genres and the three categories
of identification outlined above will become more evident if examined in
specific instances of rhetorical discourse. As examples, three messages of
Abraham Lincoln may be considered. The first is his message to a special
session of Congress made on July 4 of 1861. I will treat this as an example
of deliberative rhetoric, since it is the speech in which Lincoln lays out his
policy of using military force to sustain the Union. The second speech, which
illustrates the features of forensic rhetoric, is the Cooper Union Address of
the previous year. Finally, I will examine his Second Inaugural Address as
epideictic.
Deliberation: Identity of Action
Lincoln's fourth-of-July speech of 1861 is a policy speech aimed at secur
ing resources and political support for the execution of war against the in
surrectionist states. In it Lincoln summarizes the events leading up to the
bombardment of Fort Sumter, outlines the response of the federal govern
ment, and asks Congress for authorization to raise an army. Seeing the Union
caught in a dilemma that forces it to choose between "immediate dissolution
or blood," Lincoln proclaims the necessity of arms.
Consistent with those features that Aristotle associates with the deliberative
genre, Lincoln's speech is addressed to a legislative body whose cooperation
he needed in order to execute the war. In similar accordance with the Ar
istotelian genre is its temporal orientation to the future. Although there are
moments of reflection and judgment upon the past which might be sugges
tive of a forensic orientation, the general aim of the speech is the justification
of Lincoln's policy of war.
This argument is developed along several fronts. In a fashion that Franklin
Roosevelt would latter emulate in his own declaration of war, Lincoln sets
the stage for his policy proposals by reviewing the Southern acts of aggres
sion that justify his proposed military response. As Lincoln constructs the
situation, by seeking to actualize secession through military action, the
Southern states had crossed a line that the President had drawn in his In
augural Address of four months earlier.
Turning from this introductory narrative, Lincoln then makes the argument,
more familiar to us in his Gettysburg oration, that the conflict has a greater
global significance as a test of the durability of democratic governments.
Thus for Lincoln, the question of whether a "constitutional republic, or de
mocracy ... can or cannot maintain its territorial integrity against its own
10
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol34/iss1/1
SPEAKER AND GAVEL 7
domestic foes," turned upon the outcome of this warJ^ This larger purpose
of determining whether a democracy was not "too weak to maintain its own
existence," left the nation with no choice "but to call out the war power of
the Government; and so to resist force employed for its destruction, by force
for its own preservation."^^
The global significance that Lincoln attributes to this conflict is acknowl
edged at two junctures in the speech, at the end of his introductory remarks
concerning happenings at Fort Sumter'" and again at the beginning of his
peroration.'^ This sweeping claim encompasses the controversial policies that
are advanced in the speech and makes them appear as a much smaller matter
than they would have seemed in isolation. Lincoln's proposals to suspend
habeas corpus for insurrectionists, to mobilize a standing army of 400,000,
and to raise the debt ceiling to $600,000,000 are subsumed beneath the
more general purpose of preserving the Union.
Thus while the July, 1861 message dwells upon a number of issues per
taining to the execution of the war, these matters are drawn together into a
unified vision of the future of democracy. This future is described by Lincoln
as the outcome of what the audience is being asked to enact. In the language
used by Burke to describe rhetorical events, we would say that the locus of
this speech is an act. This means that those who find themselves within the
message as its subjects, also find themselves described as subjects who are
doing something in defense of global democracy. The thing described in the
speech with which they are compelled to identify is an act, a demonstration
before the world of the feasibility of democracy that is enacted through war.
This "identity of action," is suggestive of the other two dimensions of iden
tification, (those of context and being), but the focus of the speech is upon
action—a military venture that will preserve American democracy and en
sure the future of democratic government globally. The persons who enter
into the speech by assenting to its proposals find themselves sharing in this
symbolic act. By agreeing with Lincoln's assessment of what this war means
as an act, they accept as their own those actions which are capable of bring
ing this future into being.
Forensics: Identity of Context
If we examine a forensic speech, we will see something different, namely
the construction of an identity that is formulated through reference to some
context of reality with which the audience is asked to associate itself. An
example of this can be found in Lincoln's address of 1860 at the Cooper
Union in New York, a speech which established the justice of Republican
opposition to the extension of slavery by situating this policy within a frame
work of Constitutional interpretation. In this case the "identity of context" is
a shared understanding of the Constitution's legal jurisdiction.
Aristotle recognized that forensic discourses are concerned with the past,
with "what has been done," or more specifically with what has been done
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in violation of the law."' In such situations of rhetoric, the legal principles
which are at issue are inseparable from the act under judgment; they con
stitute the context of reality from which an action gains its legal status. Since
these legal realities also belong to the past, it is the task of forensic discourse
to exhume them. To put this differently we might say that courtroom dis
course is as strongly compelled to examine legal history as it is to examine
the history of a particular case. The specific deeds that a court is called upon
to consider cannot be judged unless there is also some consideration of the
governing principles around which the community has elected to organize
its existence. This is the message's context of identity.
Like more conventional instances of courtroom forensics, Lincoln's Cooper
Union speech addresses specific actions and the legal context in which they
occur. The legal question that lies at the heart of the speech is the consti
tutionality of federal efforts to regulate the expansion of slavery within the
western territories. The actions at issue are the voting patterns of elected
officials who had formerly been signers of the Constitution. By showing that
the same men who framed the Constitution have subsequently acted in ac
cordance with the assumption that the federal government has the authority
to regulate slavery in the territories, Lincoln upholds the constitutionality of
such actions. Lincoln shows that these framers have acted in accordance
with the assumption that the Constitution grants such regulatory powers to
the federal government.
In Lincoln's judgment, the authoritative answer to this general question
will be found in the voting behavior of the Constitution's framers. By asking
his audience to pass judgment upon the intentions of the founders, Lincoln
also invites them to place themselves within the constitutional context in
which the founders lived. He invites them to identify the Constitution as the
scene of their own actions and to see themselves as actors whose work is
performed within the historical and judicial setting that was created for them
by the authors of the Constitution. They enter into an historical consciousness
that requires that they view their present resistance to the extension of slavery
as fitting within the Constitutional context that was formulated seventy years
earlier.i^
Ultimately Lincoln's speech serves the interests of partisan politics. His
examination of the voting patterns of the nation's founders is put to use as a
demonstration of the fact that the policies of his own Republican party are
consistent with those endorsed, as Lincoln repeatedly states, by "our fathers,
who framed the Government under which we live." This puts the Republi
cans inside the same sphere of political action in which the framers moved,
and it puts Stephen Douglas and his Democratic following on the outside.
Accepting this understanding of their situation, Lincoln's Republican audi-
Kennedy 48.
" It is certainly correct to say, as Leff and Mohrmann do, that "Lincoln associates
himself and Republicans with the founding fathers and Constitutional principle, and
he dissociates rival candidates and factions from those fathers and that principle," but
this is not the most significant identity in the speech. Rather it is one that sets the
stage for a Constitutional understanding that forms the context of Republican action.
Michael C. Leff and Gerald P. Mohrmann, "Lincoln at Cooper Union: A Rhetorical
Analysis of the Text," Quarterly Journal of Speech 60 (1974): 348-9.
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ence would believe itself to be safely situated within the context of political
understanding in which the nation was created.
Epideictic: Identity of Being
As noted already, Aristotle recognized that epideictic speakers concern
themselves with praise and blame. In accordance with Burke's theory of
rhetoric, the audiences for such speeches would identify with the persons
described in such discourses and with the ideals they represent. Through this
identification they take some share in the attributes that are celebrated there
in. Thus when Daniel Webster praises the valor of those aged veterans of the
Revolutionary War who were present at his Bunker Hill oration, he is not
strictly talking about this segment of the hearing audience. Rather he is prais
ing the American people through this segment, by making the virtues of these
aged heros stand in for those virtues which he would like to attribute to the
whole. In other cases of epideictic, it may be the virtues of a larger segment
of the American public with which an audience is asked to identify, such as
the younger generation of Americans that stands in for the whole in John
Kennedy's Inaugural Address. While the most familiar instances of epideictic
that come readily to mind involve praise rather than blame, the negative
instances are no less capable of defining the character of a people. Lincoln's
Second Inaugural of March, 1865 is perhaps the most familiar example of
this. The occurrence of this address immediately prior to the Union's victory
in the field, required that Lincoln consider the repercussions of the war's
termination for the forthcoming period of reconstruction. Lincoln had to con
sider the state of the Union in its imminent restoration rather than in its more
immediate state of conflict. These circumstances made a speech of praise
inappropriate, since it would invite identification from only those states faith
ful to the Union. A speech of blame, on the other hand, could encompass
both the victors and the vanquished, and so in this most prodigious of rhe
torical moments, Lincoln chose to depict the conflict not from a human
perspective but from the perspective of the God "who gives to both North
and South, this terrible war Lincoln openly declares that it is slavery
which has brought this judgment upon the nation, but he does not insist that
the South should bear the full weight of blame for this institution. The mutual
suffering that the war has brought upon both North and South is taken as
evidence of national rather than regional responsibility for this evil. Loyal
citizens and insurgents alike find themselves standing beneath a common
canopy of divine judgment.
Lincoln does not explain why this is the case. It would be more accurate
to say that he enacts this meaning by putting on the cloak of a biblical
prophet. In doing so Lincoln speaks to the religious identity of his audience
rather than to the events of the war. This enables the speech to transcend
the ordinary logic of political deliberation, (in which actions are conceptu
alized in terms of their outcomes), and to favor instead those judgments
which are based on the religious understanding of self that such a prophetic
posture would evoke. In short, Lincoln draws upon a theology of original sin
* Appelbaum 107.
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which universalizes human evil in such a way as to relativise all merely
human judgments. This enables Lincoln to then assign that magnanimous
attribute of being to his auditors that is expressed in the most famous line of
the speech; "with malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in
the right as Cod gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work
we are in. ... The mode of identification that is at work in this address is
clearly theological. After the fashion of the Hebrew prophets, Lincoln invites
his auditors to enter into a concept of the human identity that is understood
in terms of its relationship with a righteous Creator. The effect of this is a
leveling of moral differences among human beings, and in particular be
tween the North and South. To go back to the language of the Aristotelian
genre, we might say that in inviting his audience to take the Creator's per
spective on the war, Lincoln also invites them to acknowledge that, theolog
ically speaking, responsibility for the conflagration cannot be fixed upon
North or South. Lincoln remains unambiguous in identifying slavery as the
evil that brought war upon the nation, but by shining a celestial light upon
human nature, Lincoln makes vindictiveness an untenable state of being for
the victors.
Conclusion
This brief examination of some of Lincoln's oratory was designed not to
summarize the rhetorical significance of these works, but to illustrate the
patterned way in which Aristotelian notions of genre translate into a Burkean
generic scheme. Aristotle's concept of the genre is founded upon what we
would now call an instrumental conception of rhetorical discourses. The
features that Aristotle associates with each of the three genres define the
persuasive outcomes that a discourse is predisposed to achieve. An exami
nation of these genres from the vantage point that Kenneth Burke provides
is not at odds with such an understanding. It simply requires that we consider
the generic outcomes of being as well as instrumental effects. A Burkean
take on the Aristotelian genres would have us understand that human iden
tities and relationships are forged in several different ways within the public
sphere. By recognizing that identification is divisible into various species
which occur in coincidence with the genre of rhetoric that is in use, the
critic is provided with a useful critical tool. The ability of the critic to identify
a genre may coincide with the ability to predict what kind of constitutive
exigence is at stake in a rhetorical situation. This would be an especially
important consideration when generic expectations are violated or in situa
tions when they are not dictated by custom. In such cases especially, we
should expect to find that the choice of genre will be driven by the identitity
needs of the community that has authorized a rhetorical discourse.
' Appelbaum 107-8.
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The field of rhetorical criticism has become an academic enterprise that
is, in many ways, mature in its practice, advanced in its outlook, and broad
in its scope. The last several decades have seen grand exposition and criti
cism of rhetorical texts from throughout the history of human interaction,
and the tools used in those pieces of criticism have developed to a complex
and useful set of methods that can be rummaged through until the critic finds
the method that works best for the piece s/he is about to study. However,
despite the advances made in the art of rhetorical criticism, there is still much
work to be done. What to do when the critic wants to analyze a piece, and
cannot find the tool that is crafted in the way the critic wants it to be? What
to do if the critic wants to analyze a piece that demands the use of a method
that is yet to be developed? When faced with such a dilemma, the critic can
use the text to develop a new tool, or to refine a tool that is already out
there. That is the case with this critic, and the piece that I wish to analyze.
I am interested in analyzing the 1993 Supreme Court decision for Daubert
V. Merrell Dow, the case that redefined the procedures federal courts are to
use in admitting scientific and expert testimony and evidence. Wanting to
use generic criticism to analyze this decision, I found that the genres avail
able to me were not capable of capably dealing with the unique demands
of a Supreme Court decision. Supreme Court decisions involve elements of
both the forensic and deliberative genres, as outlined by Aristotle, but in
unique ways in each and every case. In this paper I look at the Daubert
decision as an example of a hybrid of forensic and deliberative genres, and
argue that the Daubert decision is successful in that it involves elements of
both genres in its statement, and in so doing, satisfies the expectations of the
audience, including the litigants, the federal courts, and the public. It is my
argument that Supreme Court decisions are a fusion of the deliberative and
forensic genres discussed by Aristotle, and the result is a rhetorical hybrid
that involves both descriptive and prescriptive action. 1 will provide the back
ground of the Daubert case, discuss the use of rhetorical hybrids in generic
criticism, the Supreme Court decision as a rhetorical hybrid, provide an anal
ysis of the Daubert v. Merrell Dow decision to demonstrate how the elements
of deliberative and forensics genres are evidenced in a Supreme Court de
cision, and outline some of the benefits of using the rhetorical hybrid in the
rhetorical analysis of Supreme Court decisions. I begin with the case.
Dauber v. Merrell Dow. Background of the Case
On June 28, 1993, the United States Supreme Court was close to finishing
its term for the year, when it presented its decision in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The case begins twenty years earlier, however,
with the birth of Jason Daubert. His mother, Joyce, had taken the drug Ben-
SPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 34, Nos. 1-4 (1997), 11-25.
15
et al.: Volume 34, Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, Fall 1996/Winter 1997/Spring 1997/
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato,
12 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
dectin, manufactured by Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, in order to alleviate
the morning sickness associated with her pregnancy. Jason was born with
birth defects—his right arm ended at his elbow, and his right hand had only
two fingers on it-the type of birth defect that affects 1 in 2,000 American
infants each year (Angier, Jan. 2, 1). However, it was claimed by the Dauberts
that Jason's birth defects were caused by his mother's use of Bendectin. Joyce
Daubert was one of an estimated 33 million women that had used Bendectin,
and Jason's case was one of more than 1,000 cases brought against Merrell
Dow in which Bendectin was claimed to have teratogenic effects.
Merrell Dow discontinued its production of the anti-nausea drug in the
late 1970s as a result of the court costs associated with the over one thousand
lawsuits brought against it by women who claimed that Bendectin had
caused birth defects-even though scientific data overwhelmingly proved
Bendectin safe, none of the lawsuits were found in favor of the plaintiffs, and
the FDA still considered Bendectin safe for production and distribution (An
gier, Jan. 2, 1). Joyce and Jason Daubert brought their suit against Merrell
Dow in the 1984 armed with animal-cell studies, live-animal studies, chem
ical-structure analyses, and epidemiological analyses, based upon recalcu
lations of the data used in the 30 studies involving 130,000 women that had
concluded that Bendectin was safe. The Daubert's case was thrown out in
1989 by the District Court, however, who decided that the scientific studies
provided overwhelming proof that the drug was safe (Blackmun, 2791-2).
This decision was upheld in 1991 by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, who cited the 1923 Frye v. United States case, stating that
expert opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the
technique is generally accepted as reliable in the scientific community
(Blackmun, 2792).
The Supreme Court's decision on June 28, 1993 on Daubert was not to
decide whether Bendectin caused birth defects, or if Merrell Dow should be
held responsible; it was a decision of whether the expert testimony that was
to be supplied by the Daubert legal team was to be admissible or not. The
basis for the Daubert case came from a seventy year old court decision that
produced what is referred to as the Frye test. In 1923, James Frye was charged
with first degree murder in the District of Columbia. His lawyer asked that
the results of a new test be admitted as evidence of his clients innocence,
or that his client should be allowed to have the test conducted in front of
the jury. The test referred to by Frye's defense was the polygraph, or lie
detector, test. The polygraph had only been used for a short while, and many
scientific and technical experts were not sure of its reliability (only because
many of them had not yet used it or seen it used). Frye was being tried on
circumstantial evidence, and claimed that the polygraph test would prove
that he was indeed innocent.
The judge in the Frye case handed down a short, nine paragraph decision
that ruled that the results of the polygraph test, whether conducted inside or
outside the courtroom, were not admissible as the test did not meet the
"general acceptance" test. The "general acceptance" test, as first outlined
by the judge in the Frye murder trial, simply stated that a scientific or tech
nical method, or mechanism, or the testimony concerning that method or
mechanism, was not admissible as evidence or testimony unless that tech-
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nique or mechanism was recognized as reliable by a consensus of the rel
evant scientific community Oasanoff, 80-81).' The Frye test became the rec
ognized standard for the admissibility of scientific and expert testimony and
evidence.
In filing for a grant of certiorari (the right to try the case in front of the
high Court), Daubert provided two questions to the Court: is the Frye test of
"general acceptance" superseded by the 1975 Federal Rules of Evidence that
provides a more liberal criteria for the admission of expert testimony, and, if
Frye is still valid, whether or not scientific data must be subjected to peer
review in order to conclude general acceptance (Rehnquist, 2799). The Court
decided that the Federal Rules of Evidence did supersede the Frye test, mean
ing that the second question was moot. What the Court did not do was to
decide whether the expert testimony provided by the Daubert team was
admissible—only that the lower courts should use the more liberal Rules to
decide. I now turn to generic criticism.
Generic Criticism and Rhetorical Hybrids
Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson have done much to
explicate and develop the use of generic criticism. Through their books. Form
and Genre: Shaping Rhetorical Action, and Deeds Done in Words, as well
as articles such as "Rhetorical Hybrids: Fusions of Generic Elements," from
the Quarterly Journal of Speech, they have helped bring together different
views on generic criticism from throughout our field, and redefine, by ex
plicating the useful elements of others' work, the role and purpose of generic
criticism. As they note in the introduction to Form and Genre, certain con
stants exist in the study of genre:
1) Classification is justified only by the critical illumination it produces, not
by the neatness of a classificatory schema; 2) Generic criticism is taken as a
means toward systematic, close textual analysis; 3) A genre is a complex, an
amalgam, a constellation of substantive, situational, and stylistic elements;
4) Generic analysis reveals both the conventions and affinities that a work
shares with others; it uncovers the unique elements in the rhetorical act, the
particular means by which a genre is individuated in a given case. (333)
Generic criticism is a means for scholars to analyze a text closely, and to
use the standard elements of that genre to determine how well the text being
studied meets the standards of a particular genre. What is so useful about
the standards of a particular genre? As Campbell and Jamieson note, the
rhetorical elements of a genre are "stylistic and substantive responses to
perceived situational demands." (Form, 334). Elements of the genre are used
by the rhetor because of the expectations of the audience and situation in
which they are speaking. What is distinctive about the genre is that the
rhetorical forms, the rhetorical standards for that particular genre, are not
simply found in isolation—these same elements are found in any number of
rhetorical transactions. It is the fact that these same forms and standards are
' James Frye was convicted of first degree murder, and had been in prison for over
four years when another person confessed to the crime (Jasanoff, 80).
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found together in very similar ways that provides the outline of the genre
(Campbell and Jamieson, "Forms," 335).
Because the genre is given its unique character as a result of there being
a number of rhetorical forms or standards present together, the fact that some
of those forms can be found in other genres is not a critical problem. This
means that even though Aristotle outlined three basic genres (forensic, de
liberative, and epideictic), the presence of epideictic rhetorical forms in fo
rensic oratory is not a problem (Campbell and Jamieson, "Forms," 336). The
genres, therefore, can be visualized in the form of a Venn diagram; they are
not distinct categories for rhetorical forms that are not allowed to intersect.
In fact, there is much intersection, with the borrowing of rhetorical forms
from one genre to the other. Even more interesting is the development of
new genres—genres that find themselves at the intersections of Aristotle's
basic three genres. Campbell and Jamieson call such generic blends "rhe
torical hybrids," and in so doing use a biological metaphor to "emphasize
the productive but transitory character of these combinations" (Campbell and
Jamieson, "Hybrid," 147). The danger of visualizing rhetorical hybrids as
Venn diagrams is that one might simply think of the hybrid as a list of ele
ments—certain elements from one genre, mixed with certain elements from
another genre produce the hybrid. The rhetorical hybrid is more complex
and, I would argue, richer in its possible applications and analysis than sim
ply a list of elements. The real usefulness, as pointed out by Campbell and
Jamieson, of identifying and analyzing these rhetorical hybrids is that it helps
to understand the coherence of complex rhetorical forms, as well as provid
ing a normative standard for judgment of the rhetorical piece.
The reader might think of the hybrid as a constellation of elements from
different genres, or of the overlap between genres as a continuum. Along
this continuum, each point represents a different mixture of elements from
the two basic genres. A different type of rhetorical transaction could be found
at each point, each with different situational demands. If we were to look at
the rhetorical hybrid found between the epideictic and forensic genres, dif
ferent rhetorical transactions would exact different situational demands that
would require a different mixture of epideictic and forensic elements. In
some instances, the epideictic would be the dominant genre, and in others
the forensic would be. In most cases the mixture of elements (and the dom
inance of a particular genre) cannot be determined by the critic until after
each transaction is analyzed. This is certainly the case for eulogies given by
political leaders, as analyzed by Jamieson and Campbell, as the hybrid Aoc-
curs infrequently and under variable circumstances. (Jamieson and Camp
bell, "Hybrids", 154) The rhetorical transactions analyzed by Jamieson and
Campbell are infrequent enough that public expectations have not been de
veloped concerning these types of politicized eulogies.
Jamieson and Campbell do provide for rhetorical hybrids that occur with
some regularity and create formal expectations in the knowledgeable audi
ence. (Jamieson and Campbell, "Hybrids", 154) These hybrids are either the
result of recurrent events, such as Presidential inaugurals that combine epi
deictic elements with deliberative elements, or are sustained by an institu
tion, such as the papacy and its encyclicals that fuse elements of the apostolic
letter with those of the Roman imperial decree (Jamieson and Campbell,
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"Hybrids, 154-5). In such cases the longevity of the hybrid may make it
difficult for us to perceive elements borrowed from different genres.(Jamieson
and Campbell, "Hybrids", 156) There are hybrids, however, that are both
the result of recurrent events, and that are sustained by an institution. An
example of a rhetorical hybrid that fits both of these exceptions is that of
Supreme Court decisions, in which the institution sustains the fusion of de
liberative and forensic elements in recurring situations. Each rhetorical trans
action, each Supreme Court decision, is unique in the way that it uses de
liberative and forensic elements, so that the longevity of this rhetorical hybrid
does not result in the difficulty jamieson and Campbell describe. I turn to
this rhetorical hybrid.
Supreme Court Decisions as a Rhetorical Hybrid
In The Art of Rhetoric, Aristotle provides a framework for analyzing dif
ferent forms of rhetoric. Aristotle provides three genres of rhetoric: deliber
ative, forensic and display. The objective of the deliberative orator is advan
tage or harm, as to exhort is to urge as being more advantageous, to deter
to dissuade as being more harmful (Aristotle, 1358b22-24). The deliberative
is the political realm—and it includes five subjects: revenue, war and peace,
the defense of the realm, imports and exports and legislation (Aristotle,
1359b21-22). The deliberative orator is concerned with the happiness of the
people (Aristotle, 1360b4-1362a18), and the issues discussed by the delib
erative orator, the subjects of deliberation, are decided by us (the orator and
the people) (Aristotle, 1359b1-3). An important characteristic of the role of
the deliberative orator is that of expediency—as Aristotle says, for debates
are not about the end but about the means to it, which are the measures
that are practically expedient, expediency being a good thing (1362a22-24).
Similarly, expediency is the good for the individual, in the presence of which
he is well disposed and self-sufficient. (Aristotle, 1362a32-33) For Aristotle,
the deliberative orator should be concerned with the issues designated as
important by the community, and they should deal with those issues with
expediency, the happiness of the community, and self-sufficiency in mind.
Aristotle also discusses the genre of forensic oratory—concerned with jus
tice and injustice (1358b26). Forensic oratory consists of oratory for either
the prosecution or the defense. For each of these, the orator must deal with
either particular or general law, and whether or not certain acts are criminal
in nature. For all of forensic oratory, however, the oratory always discusses,
and is centered, around an act that has already occurred, and whether that
act violates a particular or general law (whether it was just or unjust). This
genre fails to provide a method of analysis for modern day court decisions,
as this genre assumes the advocacy used by the prosecution or defense, and
not the oratory used by the judge in adjudicating the case. The judge is not
speaking as advocate of either side (at least they are not supposed to). The
judge is instead supposed to discuss the outcome of the case.
Another problem with the forensic genre, as outlined by Aristotle, is that
it assumes that the oratory will act only on a descriptive level—it is supposed
to be concerned with the specifics of the case on trial, exclusively. Court
decisions do more than decide the specifics of the case, however. The Amer-
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ican legal educational system was patterned after the case method developed
by Christopher Columbus Langdell at Harvard Law School (Matlon, 188).
Within this framework, legal students study past court decisions in order to
understand the way that legal logic works in particular instances. Court de
cisions are also used by the courts to decide cases—termed precedence—
which means that in deciding a case, the court judge will not only analyze
the legislation that might be applicable, but they will also analyze past court
decisions, believing that those decisions will offer guidance in interpreting
the legislation as well as the specifics of the case. As a result of the case
study method and precedence, court decisions are not merely descriptive of
the specifics of the case heard by the court, they are also prescriptive of how
legislation, or legal problem areas, should be interpreted in the future. Given
the prescriptive nature of court decisions, a more helpful analysis of these
decisions might include them in the deliberative genre. However, for most
court decisions (i.e., any U.S. court decision not coming from the Supreme
Court), the forensic genre is still dominant as the prescriptive nature of the
decision is subordinate to the fact that the decision is a judgment of the
specifics of the case. In fact, the lower the court from which the decision is
rendered, the more dominant the forensic genre, as the decision is less likely
to be looked at as precedent in future cases. After all, if the decision is made
on an issue that is particularly new, or uncharted (i.e., there have been few
decisions rendered on that issue), then the case will likely make its way up
to higher courts (and eventually the Supreme Court). For the Supreme Court,
however, the rhetorical hybrid can have either the forensic or deliberative as
the dominant genre. In each case in which the Court decides, there are two
actions taken; 1) a decision over the specific issues raised by the litigants, in
much the same way that any court in the United States is assigned to do,
and 2) a decision to be used by all federal courts (and state courts in most
instances) in their future deliberations. In this way, the Supreme Court takes
both descriptive and prescriptive action, and as a result, I would argue, acts
as both court and legislature. The Supreme Courts' decisions are not simply
based upon past Court precedent. After all, in the Daubert case, each lower
court decided that the Frye test would exclude the evidence. This means that
each lower decision implicitly decided that the Frye test was the true stan
dard for the admissibility of scientific evidence and testimony. However, the
Supreme Court decided that each lower decision was flawed, as the Federal
Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye test. In this way, the Courts' decision
was not simply a decision of the specifics of the Daubert case (the specifics
were never approached by the Court), and the Court did not rely upon past
precedent to make its decision. The hierarchy of reference for the Supreme
Court is the following: it first looks to the Constitution, then to legislation,
then to past Supreme Court decisions, and then to other courts' decisions,
in order to make its decision. The true template for the Supreme Court,
however, is the Constitution, and in its decisions it must decide whether or
not a piece of legislation, or a past court decision, violated the Constitutional
rights of the plaintiff.
The Dauberf decision, however, was not concerned with the Constitutional
rights of the plaintiff, but was instead concerned about whether a piece of
legislation superseded a previous court decision. This means that the Courts'
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decision that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye test was an
instance in which the Court decided that a legislative action (the Federal
Rules of Evidence) was of more importance than a judicial action (the Frye
test). Of course, this is the way that the Court is supposed to deal with such
an instance: recognizing the primacy of legislative action, right behind the
Constitution.
There is a minimum threshold for the presence of both deliberative and
forensic elements in this rhetorical hybrid. What is interesting is that at each
end of the continuum (i.e. the minimum thresholds for the presence of de
liberative and forensic elements), there may be no explicit presence of the
genre at its minimum threshold. For instance, in a Supreme Court decision
in which the forensic genre is by far the dominant genre, it is possible that
the Court would only discuss the specifics of the case, without including any
deliberative elements—elements with which the Court prescribes the actions
of other courts. However, because it is the Supreme Court, there are situa-
tional demands resulting from its past decisions, as well as resulting from the
institutional establishment and continuation of the Supreme Court. This
means that even when the Courts' decision does not explicitly say that it
must be heeded by lower courts or legislatures, that it will be received by
those lower courts and legislatures as an edict from above. There is also the
possible influence of another genre or ceremonial context at work in a legal
decision. Given the rhetorical and social nature of the courtroom, each de
cision will likely find itself inextricably intertwined in a current political or
ethical social debate. This rhetorical characteristic of the courtroom neces
sitates consideration of the decisions' social context by the rhetorical critic,
and whether or not that context is relevant to their study.
The same is true when the Courts' decision is dominated by elements from
the deliberative genre. The specifics of the case might not be discussed in
the decision, but the decision still decides upon an issue that has obvious
implications for the specific case. The Daubert decision is an instance of this.
In its decision, the Court never discusses whether or not the expert's testi
mony provided by Daubert should be admitted as evidence. Instead, the bulk
of the decision, as well as the actions taken by the Court within the decision,
deal with how future courts should use the Federal Rules of Evidence in
determining the admissibility of expert and scientific testimony and evidence.
Certainly the specifics of the Daubert case are discussed, but only in such a
way as to frame the larger issues in the case. Of course, the fact that the
Court does not decide upon the admissibility of the testimony in the Daubert
case is by the plaintiff's design—in asking for its case to be heard, the plaintiff
only presented the Court with questions concerning the larger issues of the
case. If nothing else, this provides evidence for the expectations of the liti
gants, and that those expectations fall in line with those that would be ex
pected with this rhetorical hybrid.
The Supreme Court, I would contend, must act in a political nature with
every case. F^rt of the reason why this is true is because of the role the Court
plays in today's legal structure. The Supreme Court is the last arbiter of legal
problems—if two parties cannot accept the decision of a lower court, they
can continue to appeal the decision until it reaches the Supreme Court, at
which time a final decision is made. As such, there is a great call for assis-
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tance from the Supreme Court. Thousands of litigants file for a grant of cer-
tiorari (a right to be heard by the Court) each year, but only a small per
centage of them are granted that right. The Court must only accept cases
that represent an entire class of cases—the issues involved in the case must
address a problem that is being felt across the legal system. For instance, in
the case of Daubert, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in light of sharp
divisions among the courts regarding the proper standard for the admission
of expert testimony. (Blackmun, 2792) Given the fact that the Court is un
likely to accept a case unless it represents a problem faced in a number of
cases (and a number of courts), it seems likely that the decision would have
to be written in such a way as to offer guidance in those other cases—in
other words, it is prescriptive in the way legislation, or problem areas, are
dealt with.
The Supreme Court might present a decision that is dominated by delib
erative elements that do not simply instruct lower courts how to use a legal
procedure, but that tell society how to deal with a politicized social problem.
There are, of course, extreme instances in which this would seem most ap
propriate. As Lempereur notes, issues involving difficult societal problems,
such as abortion, raises the deep structure of certain legal problems. The
question is of political nature [for the Supreme Court]; and when it is raised,
the solution is political, hiding the existing conflict and its expression which
is rhetorical, through the appearance of a purely technical solution: law be
comes the substitute of politics, as logic was of rhetoric.(291) There are two
types of political action for the Court to take. The first is that of the delib
erative within the confines of the Constitution. As with the example above,
when the Supreme Court discusses procedural issues, or decides that a piece
of legislation is not Constitutional, then it is acting in a political mode, but
one that is defined for it. The United States Constitution defines the estab
lishment of three branches of government: the executive, the legislative, and
the judicial. The legislative is to create legislation—the rules for us to live
by, and the judicial is to act as the forum in which the rules are used as the
template to judge the actions of an individual. The judicial branch is to use
the rules provided by the legislature to judge possible offenders of the rules.
The Supreme Court also decides whether or not those pieces of legislation
are allowed by the Constitution.
There are also instances, however, when the Court must decide upon is
sues that are not clearly defined within the Constitution. The Court has also
taken political action that is not within the confines of the Constitution, and
when it does so, it is forced to base its decisions upon fragments of past
decisions, along with fragments of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights that
might support parts of its decision. Critics of such policy refer to this as
judicial activism, and claim that these are instances in which the Court is
making policy, when it should be constrained by the Constitution—it should
not decide on issues that are not made clear by the Constitution. However,
as noted above by Lempereur, these instances are ones in which the Court
is deciding upon cases representing social problems. These types of cases
are important for the rhetorical critic to recognize, as they are instances in
which the rhetorical hybrid of Supreme Court decisions is taken in another
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direction, with different, more politically charged, deliberative elements be
ing included within the hybrid.
Supreme Court decisions routinely involve elements of both forensic and
deliberative genres. Aristotle recognizes that "there is the same method for
political and forensic oratory" (1354b23-24). The Supreme Court not only
employs the same oratory as that would be used for political forums, it also
presents decisions that act in a political nature, as they do not simply decide
on whether a case is just or unjust. There are also some similarities in the
way the Court decides cases, and the way Aristotle describes the role of the
deliberative orator. He said that in deliberative discussions, "debates are not
about the end but about the means to it, which are the measures that are
practically expedient, expediency being a good thing"(1362a22-24). The
deliberative orator must be concerned with the good of the community, and
in delivering that good with all due expediency. There are, however, two
phases in the decision-making process for the Court. The first is the time that
it takes for a case to make its way to the Court. There are many years that
usually elapse before the case can make its way to the Supreme Court for
possible admission. The case must first, in most instances, be tried on the
local level, then by the Appeals Court, then through the federal courts, and
then it may finally be sent to the Supreme Court for consideration. The reason
why this is not a serious problem for the expediency Aristotle is concerned
with is that the Supreme Court is not the only deliberative forum in the
country. In its prescriptive actions, it is not taking over the job of the legis
lature; it is, instead, refining or adding to legislative action. Furthermore,
Aristotle's concern with expediency is rooted in the desire for actio—he did
not want the legislature to debate endlessly about something before making
a decision. Even though it might take a number of years before a case can
be heard by the Supreme Court, it has, in the meantime, been heard by
several other courts. Each court makes it decision, and the only reason the
case may continue to the next level is that one of the parties is not happy
with the outcome of that decision, and has the legal and economic resources
to take the dispute to the next level. There is a form of expediency here, it
is just not one of finalized results.
The second phase is the most recognizable—the time taken for the Court
to make a decision about a case. The Court recognizes the need for expe
diency in its decision-making. As Linda Greenhouse explains, "t]he Justices
are ... accountable. They explain themselves. Congress and the White House
can put off decisions indefinitely; entire agendas sink without a trace. But
the Court publicly disposes of everything on its docket, every petition, every
motion. Every case argued in a term gets some resolution that term."(84)
Similarly, as Aristotle describes the agenda of the deliberative orator being
determined by society, Lempereur states that ALaw is made of the resolution
of social problems ... law always means the expression of the transition (1)
from a social problem, which comes from a difference ... (2) to its solution,
which must reestablish the social peace, the social identity between peo-
ple"(291—emphasis in original). The forensic and deliberative spheres are
actually very close in this way—the only differences come in how specific
instances in each sphere look towards resolution.
The rhetorical hybrid of Supreme Court decisions, and the unique qualities
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of Supreme Court decision, is also able to account for Aristotle's concern
about the court's limited scope for review. Aristotle preferred the deliberative
forums because in the creation of laws, the way the law would work could
be looked at over time and in different situations, while in the courtroom,
the judge is only able to look at a single moment—the instance in question
(1354b1-10). The concern, then, is that if the Court is only looking at one
instance of the law, then should they be able to provide prescriptive instruc
tions? As mentioned above, the Supreme Court is not taking over for the
legislature, so this concern is mitigated by the fact that there will continue
to be someone looking at the diachronic aspects of the law. Furthermore,
the laws written by Congress are inevitably too broad, with need of refining.
The Court is able to not only make sure that the laws are constitutional, but
also that they are sufficiently explained for use in the lower courts in the
future. The concern that their prescriptive action may be too limited is im
portant; however, the Court recognizes that it cannot hear every case that is
sent to it, and, as a result, picks one case to represent a class of cases. Then
the Court, after deciding upon the specifics of the case, often discusses the
prescriptive elements of the decision with sufficient generality that they can
be used in many instances. The Supreme Court is not only looking at a single
moment, but at as much as they can.
While recent work has been done in analyzing the types of rhetoric used
in civil-rights and economic regulations cases (see Makau and Lawrence),
the Daubert case does not fit into either class of cases, and as such, it can
only be analyzed by looking at some of the characteristics of a hybrid of the
forensic and deliberative styles as stated.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow. Analysis of the Decision
The decision consisted of three parts: the unanimous decision of the Court
in Parts I and ll-A, the opinion of the Court in Parts ll-B, ll-C, III, and IV^
and the dissent filed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens. Justice
Blackmun delivered the decision of the Court (the first two parts). In Part I,
Justice Blackmun lays out the facts in the case, and describes the history of
litigation for the case. It is in Part ll-A that the Court offers a substantive
decision- that the Federal Rules of Evidence supersedes the previously used
Frye test. An important aspect of Part I is in the Court's deference to legis
lation, much in line with Makau and Lawrence's analysis of the Court's lan
guage of deference. Makau and Lawrence state that the Court, since the early
1980s, has "an increased tendency to adopt the language of deference in
cases involving civil liberties ... reflect[ing] a shift... to a view of democracy
as a political process in which decision by an elected legislature and elected
executive officials is the only legitimate means for making fundamental mor
al choices."(193) While the Daubert decision does not deal with making
"fundamental moral choices", the language of deference is employed. Justice
Blackmun states that "[t]he merits of the Frye test have been much debated
... [pjetitioners' primary attack is not on the content but on the continuing
^ The second section of the decision, as I have described it, was supported by 7 of
the 9 Justices.
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authority of the rule" (2793), followed in the next paragraph with A[w]e
interpret the legislatively-enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as we would any
statute ... Rule 402 provides the baseline"(2793). Blackmun then uses the
rest of Part ll-A discussing not why the legislatively-enacted Rules should be
used over the judicially derived Frye test, but why the two are incompatible.
It is important to note that in deferring to the Rules, the Court does not
discuss the merits of the Rules in relation to the Frye test—instead it is simply
assumed that the Rules must be used, whether or not they are beneficiaP.
The second section of the decision (Parts ll-B, ll-C, III, and IV) is devoted
to discussing how the Rules would be used by future courts to determine the
admissibility of expert testimony. Again, let me note that in this discussion,
the Court underscores its deference to the legislature by not judging the
efficacy of the Rules, but simply as interpreters for future courts.
The third section of the decision is that of the dissent, as presented by
Chief Justice Rehnquist on behalf of himself and Justice Stevens. This section
of the decision acts as a critique of the first two, in that it discusses some of
the anticipated problems resulting from the decision. Rehnquist and Stevens
agree with the rest of the Court in the first section of the decision-—that the
Frye test does not survive the Federal Rules of Evidence. The cause for dissent
is in the Court's use of the second section to offer some "general observa
tions" about the use of the Rules. Rehnquist argues that these observations
suffer from the flaw common to most such observations—they are not ap
plied to deciding whether or not particular testimony was or was not admis
sible, and therefore they tend to be not only general, but vague and abstract.
(2799) Instead, the Court would be far better advised in this case to decide
only the questions presented, and to leave the further development of this
important area of the law to future cases (Rehnquist, 2800).
Upon examination of the decision, the reader would likely notice that the
question posed to the Court is very different from the types of questions that
one would expect to hear a court decide. Instead of asking the Court whether
or not the testimony of their experts was admissible, the Daubert legal team
simply asked the Supreme Court whether or not the Federal Rules of Evi
dence superseded the Frye test. This has two implications: 1) I would argue
that the question is determined by the nature of the venue. In other words,
the question is limited to a very basic procedural one because it was sub
mitted to the Supreme Court. As mentioned above, there are usually a num
ber of similar cases that are submitted to the Supreme Court, and the Court
must decide which of that group they should hear (if any at all). By only
asking a procedural question, it is possible that the Daubert legal team in
creased its chances of being heard instead of another case dealing with
Bendectin. A limited question left the Court with a lot of freedom—the Court
could decide how far it would go in both its descriptive and prescriptive
roles. This, however, results in 2) the fact that the Court, according to Rehn-
^ I realize that it could be argued that this is not a rhetorical move, but simply
recognition that the Court is supposed to look first to the Constitution, then to legis
lation, then to court interpretations of the first two; however, it is important, I believe,
that the Court does not even entertain the notion that the reason why they should
defer to the Rules is that they are beneficial.
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quist, did not go far enough in its prescriptive action. The Court did decide
upon the matter—that the Frye test was superseded, and then offered "Gen
eral observations" that "Acustomarily carry great weight with lower
courts"{Rehnquist, 2799). These observations, however, were "not applied
to deciding whether or not particular testimony was or was not admissible,
and therefore they tend to be not only general, but vague and ab-
stract."(Rehnquist, 2799) This means that because the Court remained vague,
in that it did not decide whether or not Daubert's expert testimony was ad
missible, it made it difficult for lower courts to know how to use the Federal
Rules of Evidence—the prescriptive action taken by the Court was too vague.
In the case of Daubert, the very nature of the rhetorical hybrid of Supreme
Court decisions may have resulted in the plaintiff's limiting their question,
which then partly resulted in the Court failing, according to Rehnquist, to
explicate adequately the prescriptive actions they were discussing. With this
example, the rhetorical critic can analyze not only the rhetorical hybrid, but
the way that the hybrid, the expectations of the institution and the setting,
may have prevented the orator (the Supreme Court) from satisfying the rhe
torical forms of this genre. This paradoxical result is not the norm, and it is
not another of the rhetorical forms of this genre. However, it certainly is an
interesting example of how this rhetorical hybrid works, and can fail to work.
The deliberative genre was dominant within the Daubert decision, as the
decision did little to decide the specifics of the case, but instead was con
cerned with prescribing the use of the Federal Rules of Evidence for future
courts. In prescribing the use of the Federal Rules of Evidence in determining
the admissibility of expert and scientific testimony and evidence, the Court
did little to explicate methods for the courts to use. The reason that there
has been much debate among legal theorists about the admissibility of highly
technical testimony and evidence is that most lawyers and judges do not
know how to effectively deal with such highly technical data. The Court says
that Rule 403 of the Federal Rules provides the baseline for admissibility of
evidence, as it states that "all relevant evidence is admissible." (Blackmun,
2793) However, if the judge in a case is not able to understand the evidence,
how is she to determine whether or not it is relevant to the case? Similarly,
it is difficult for lawyers to contest the relevancy of their opponent's admitted
evidence if they do not understand it, and do not know how to deal with it.
There are two ways that the Court could have provided the courts with the
methods: 1) it could have demonstrated how to use the Federal Rules of
Evidence, by determining, itself, whether or not the testimony provided by
Daubert was admissible, or 2) it could have provided the courts with the
explicit methods, or a set of tools, that could be used to analyze and decide
whether or not highly technical evidence and testimony were admissible.
However, the Court did neither, as it did not demonstrate the methods using
the specifics of the Daubert case, and did little to outline the methods for
future use. There are some methods discussed by the Court, including sug
gestions to look at the methodology used, whether or not it has been tested,
and whether it has been subjected to peer review (Blackmun, 2796-7). It
also mentions the use of "vigorous cross-examination, presentation of con
trary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof" as traditional
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence (Black-
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mun, 2798). The Court, therefore, discusses methods from the scientific com
munity, as well as methods from the legal community. However, it com
pletely overlooks methods developed by rhetoricians and sociologists of sci
ence, which analyze the sociological, rhetorical, and political contexts in
which scientific work is conducted. Furthermore, these methods have been
developed with a keen eye towards the special needs of studies of science
(unlike the general legal methods discussed by the Court), while being de
veloped outside of the context they have been developed to study, decreasing
the chance that they are biased in favor of the context they are studying
(unlike some of the scientific methods provided by the Court).
In using the rhetorical hybrid as a normative framework for judgment of
the decision, the Daubert decision could be deemed moderately effective at
meeting the situational demands placed upon it. The expectations of the
litigants have been met, as the questions asked of the Court were answered.
However, the expectations of the lower courts, as well as the rest of the legal
community, were not met, as the Court failed to provide a complete frame
work for the determination of technical evidence and testimony admissibility.
While a few methods were provided for the use of future courts, the Court
did not demonstrate how to use the Federal Rules of Evidence, which they
state must be used over the easy and oft-used Frye test. Rehnquist is correct
when he claims that the Court's "General observations" were "not only gen
eral, but vague and abstract" (Rehnquist, 2799). Rehnquist concludes by
stating that he believes that "the Court would be far better advised in this
case to decide only the questions presented, and to leave the further devel
opment of this important area of the law to future cases" (Rehnquist, 2800).
However, he also concedes that "Rule 702 confides to the judge some gate-
keeping responsibility in deciding questions of the admissibility of proffered
expert testimony, "which means that the judges will have to know how to
determine the admissibility of technical evidence and testimony (Rehnquist,
2800). Why would Rehnquist want to opt for not offering judges any guid
ance in determining evidence admissibility, instead of offering them a set of
incomplete, and general observations? While Rehnquist is correct about the
limited utility of the "general observations" provided by the Court, the Court
would completely fail to meet the expectations of the legal community if it
were to follow Rehnquist's lead.
The benefit of using the rhetorical hybrid in analyzing a Supreme Court
decision is that the critic can begin her analysis by looking for which genre
(deliberative or forensic) is dominant, and then analyzing the use of elements
from each genre in the decision, before using the framework to decide upon
the effectiveness of the Court in meeting the expectations of the litigants, the
legal community, as well as the public. As long as the critic recognizes that
the elements will be found in different concentrations and configurations in
each decision, she will be able to use the rhetorical hybrid to critically study
and comment on the complex nature of Supreme Court decisions as rhetor
ical transactions.
Conclusion
Campbell and Jamieson do a good job of not only demonstrating the use
fulness of generic criticism, but also of their analysis of rhetorical hybrids.
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Rhetorical hybrids enable the rhetorical critic to analyze increasingly com
plex, and common, rhetorical acts. Supreme Court decisions, as rhetorical
hybrids, are good examples of how complex these rhetorical acts have be
come. The Supreme Court and its decisions is a useful location for the rhe
torical critic interested in rhetorical hybrids, in that its decisions are the result
of both recurring situations, as well as the result of its being sustained as an
institution. However, while the decisions are recurrent, they are always very
different from one another, as the Court, ever mindful of its limited docket
space, must only accept cases that are representative of a class of cases. This
means that while the decisions are recurrent, the nature of the cases is not,
resulting in each case dealing with unique issues, and, as a result, with a
very different mixture of deliberative and forensic elements.
The decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow provides an example of how this
hybrid is constructed, developed, and responded to. The paradoxical result
in this case, constructed by the fact that the questions posed by the litigants
might have prevented the Court from satisfying the expectations of the Court's
audience, offers the rhetorical critic some insight into the workings of the
hybrid that might not be possible were the paradox not to exist. For instance,
both the expectations of the litigants and the ways that the Court meets (and
fails to meet) those expectations are highlighted with the discussion of the
paradox, and it illustrates the components of the rhetorical transaction, as
well as elements of the rhetorical hybrid for the critics and the reader. The
paradox also helps the critic do their own prescriptive work in defining how
the hybrid can be used more effectively in the future.
There is still work to be done in the area of rhetorical hybrids. However,
instead of merely documenting and cataloguing the different types of rhe
torical hybrids, a more useful approach might be to outline different ap
proaches a critic might take towards a hybrid, as well as to outline other
possible benefits. It seems certain that the use of the rhetorical hybrid is a
useful, and beneficial method for the rhetorical critic to add to her repertoire.
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CONTEMPORARY WOMEN AT THE
PUBLIC PODIUM:
MEDIA INFLUENCE AND THE CONTINUED
DEVALUING OF WOMEN AS SPEAKERS
Sally A. Caudill
Macalester College
On July 4, 1828, Frances Wright delivered the first recorded public speech
by a woman in the United States. Since that time, the number of women
stepping up to the podium has increased substantially. Scholars, although
slow to begin examining and appreciating these works of oratory, were
spurred to do so by the contemporary women's movement. The resulting
attention to women's speaking has taken a variety of forms. Led by Karlyn
Kohrs Campbell (1989), a number of scholars have worked to reclaim and
critique the outstanding oratory of the first women speakers (Anderson, 1984;
DuBois, 1981; Green, 1980; Linkugel, 1963). A second body of scholarship
has focused on contemporary women orators (Blankenship et al., 1986; Dow
& Tonn, 1993; Merron & Caddy, 1986; Reynolds, 1973; Thompson, 1979).
These works have provided rhetorical analyses of women's texts, and in the
process legitimated both the positions and the rhetoric of these women. In
both of these streams of research, a major focus has been to explore the way
gender norms have influenced women's approach to oratory.
There is, however, another aspect to the gendering of public speech. In a
mass mediated society, the media serve substantial functions of gate keeping
and framing. They may constitute or reconstitute gender norms by silencing
or reshaping the speech of female political orators. Because women are
working to gain equal access to both the podium and political offices, it is
important to consider the role the national media plays in the success of
these women in the political arena. This essay explores the media's re-pres-
entation of women's oratory by examining press coverage of the 1992 Dem
ocratic and Republican national conventions.
Coverage of Women's Speaking
A substantial body of work has explored the multiple ways gender roles
and expectations influence women's experiences at the podium, particularly
in the political arena (Jamieson, 1988; Procter, Aden, & Japp, 1988; Trent &
Friedenberg, 1991). The majority of this work considers constraints that wom
en face when approaching the podium. Gender stereotypes suggest that
women should be supportive, caring, and polite. Thus, when at the podium
speaking to influence the public vote, women are put in a double bind. If
they speak assertively, they are critiqued for not meeting female expectations;
The author wishes to thank Dr. Marsha Vanderford, Dr. Celeste Condit,
and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.
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if they speak to meet the gendered stereotype, they are not taken seriously
as political players. Thus, there is little room for women speakers to explore
ways women combine stereotypes (Procter, Aden, & Japp, 1988) and use
different mediums Qamieson, 1988) to overcome the double bind.
Even if women are able to navigate gender norms successfully in their
speaking, media attention may subvert their efforts. The simplest way to sand
bag the efforts of women is to silence them by failing to give them equal
coverage with their male counterparts. In addition, however, the media may
contextualize women differently or provide inappropriate commentary, in
equitable valuing, and disparate presentation through photographs. Some
scholars have examined media attention to women speakers on the local
level and within party papers (Silver, 1986; List, 1985). There remains, how
ever, a need to examine press coverage on a national level. Looking at the
national media coverage given to speakers at the 1992 conventions will
illuminate how women and men are portrayed as public speakers. According
to Dennis McQuail, the media have several purposes in society including
providing information about events and support for established authority and
norms (1987, p. 71). Popular media have the power to influence public
perceptions by reflecting and supporting certain established societal norms
and perceptions. Thus, the coverage of these conventions will seek to answer
the question; Do increased women's public speaking opportunities lead to
increased public value of those speech acts?
This study focuses on three national newspapers that gave full coverage to
both the 1992 Democratic and Republican national conventions. The Chi
cago Tribune, The Washington Post, and The New York Times were selected
because they represent full coverage in prominent papers. While three
sources certainly are not the maximum number of newspapers that covered
the conventions, all three papers have large national circulations and are
nationally indexed.
Methodology
The coverage of women and men speakers in all three papers is examined
through content analysis. According to Robert Weber, "the best content-
analytic studies use both qualitative and quantitative operations of texts"
(1990, p. 10). This research uses both methods by evaluating: 1) the inches
of coverage given to women and men speakers, 2) the language used to
describe women speakers and men speakers, and 3) the number of times
women and men were covered when talking about "traditional women's
issues" as well as other general political topics. The analysis focuses on the
coverage beginning the day before and ending the day after each convention.
From the examination of space, language, and topics this study explores
the structures and processes of representation, the (re)production of patriar
chal ideologies, and the assumptions of women's place in culture. The goal
here is specific attention to the valuation of women's oratory by the media.
Although the meaning and signs of "value" differ widely across fields and
contexts, this study considers "value" as an attribute which is created
through visibility, discussion, and evaluation of public speeches. Hence for
rhetoric to be valuable it must be recognized, explained, and visible.
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In addition, value is defined in relation to discussion and critique. Those
things are valuable which are "useful," "rated," and held in "respect and
estimation." Therefore value is accorded through the act of rating, determin
ing the usefulness and rank of a work, regardless of the results of the eval
uation. Value is also accorded in the results of that critique when the critic
provides a positive evaluation, indicating esteem.
Campbell's discussion of rhetoric and social value also indicates the use
fulness of visibility and critique as important measure of value. Women's
visibility in the role of public speaking is a sign of importance, "a significant
matter" (1989, p.1), because of the relationship between public speaking
and citizenship. The appearance of a woman at the podium makes the au
dience see her enacting the valued role of citizen. In addition, seeing women
as public speakers connects them to the "symbolic power of persuasion"
valued in Western Culture's humanistic tradition (1989, p. 2).
Visibility, discussion, and critique do not occur in a vacuum. Orators
compete for space in the public arena, continually struggling to attain visi
bility and evaluation of their public speaking efforts. Since men have long
held control of public forums and standards of oratorical efforts, this study
looks at how media attention distributes inclusion and discussion between
women and men public speakers in an attempt to determine the value ac
corded to contemporary women speakers. It is important to note that the
valuation of women speakers at the conventions is not a simple linear cause
and effect reaction. This study seeks to isolate one of several complex social
factors operating in the dynamic valuation process.
Coverage of Women at the Podium
The coverage of the 1992 political convention by the Chicago Tribune,
the New York Times, and The Washington Post treated men and women
speakers differently in four areas: 1) The GOP female nominating speaker
received less media coverage than did her Democratic counterpart. 2) Media
evaluated prominent men speakers more positively than prominent women
speakers. 3) Women were grouped and compared in media coverage while
men were treated as individuals. 4) A disproportionate amount of coverage
was given to women who spoke on "women's topics." This essay examines
these differences in coverage, their valuative implications for contemporary
women speakers, and suggests implications for future work, especially in
light of the notion that for rhetors to be considered significant, they have to
be seen as individuals (Foss & Foss, 1991, p. 5).
Taken individually, any single difference in the treatment of women and
men speakers might not indicate inequality between them. One might ex
plain Cuomo's greater coverage on the basis of his position as New York
Governor, or his reputation as a great contemporary orator or as a potential
presidential candidate. One might also explain the portrayal of women as
"letting down" their audience on the grounds that they really did. However,
when there is a consistent pattern of negative and exclusive coverage, these
reasons come to look like post hoc excuses, rather than underlying patterns.
The repeated patterns that will be identified here indicate that the media still
devalues women as public speakers. This argument is based on two broad
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findings: women are not considered serious players in the political arena and
they are highlighted as dependent. These arguments are supported by the
evidence that females are infrequently evaluated as speakers and they are
grouped and compared.
Nominating Speakers
On the basis of amount of coverage, women and men receive nearly equal
attention. A consideration of several variables reveals discrepancies in the
treatment within newspaper coverage that otherwise may appear equal if
one looks only at amount of coverage. Some of the most striking differences
emerge from a comparison between treatment of the nomination speakers,
Republican Lynn Martin and her male counterpart Democrat Mario Cuomo.
Lynn Martin nominated George Bush at the Republican National Convention
and Mario Cuomo nominated Bill Clinton at the Democratic National Con
vention. Media treatment of Cuomo and Martin provides an important focus
for comparing the treatment of female and male speakers. A clear parallel
case exists. Both speakers gave presidential nominating speeches, both spoke
the night before the presidential acceptance speech, and both are major
players within their parties. Martin is the highest ranking GOP woman. Cuo
mo is the Governor of New York and was almost a Presidential contender.
Media coverage of Martin and Cuomo reveal major inequities in treatment.
One major difference between the ways they were covered is the attribution
of authorship in the headlines. The Republican nominating speech received
six headlines. Martin's name was printed in two out of the six. In one of
those headlines, she is subordinated to Marilyn Quayle: "Bush Nominated
for 'Fight of Our Life': Marilyn Quayle, Martin Paint Clinton as Unfit for
Presidency" (Broder & Marcus, 1992, p. A1). A third headline referred to
Martin's role as a stand-in for Geraldine Ferraro when George Bush was
preparing for his 1984 Vice-Presidential debate. That headline reads: "Lynn
Martin: No Yes Woman" (Trueheart, 1992, p. B1). Conversely, the Demo
cratic nominating speech was mentioned in eleven headlines. Cuomo was
mentioned in all eleven headlines. His name is not subordinated to another
speaker.
In addition, photographs play an important role. Cuomo is more visible
than Martin. Martin's photograph is printed a total of six times. Four of the
six are half-inch head shots. These appear on the first day of convention
coverage along with photographs of other key speakers. The other two fea
ture Martin at the microphone. One shows Martin at the podium with a man,
"getting assistance during a microphone check" (Daley, 1992, p. A1). The
second appears along with the article explaining her role playing Geraldine
Ferraro several years earlier in a practice debate. Thus, one third of the pho
tographs show Martin in a subordinate position: helping the Vice-President
and receiving assistance. Cuomo's photo appears a total of eight times. Seven
of the eight are large photos of Cuomo speaking at the podium. The smallest
is 1.5 inches in width by 2.5 inches in length and the largest is six inches in
width and 4.5 inches in length. The eighth photo is a half inch head shot
where he is mentioned in a list of excellent orators. Unlike Martin, Cuomo
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is consistently a primary figure. Martin received one third of the photo space
Cuomo did.
Measuring the number of inches of coverage that the speakers received in
the newspapers during the conventions provides yet another way to deter
mine if the speakers received equal treatment. Newspapers dedicated a total
of approximately forty four inches to Lynn Martin in the three papers com
bined. However, eight inches came from the story in The Washington Post
about her pretending to be Ferraro. Coverage of her speech equaled only
thirty six inches. Nine inches were excerpts of her speech printed in The
New York Times. The headline for these excerpts read: "Excerpts from
Speech Nominating Bush" (1992, p. A22). Martin is not identified in the
headline as the author or presenter of the speech. Cuomo's speech received
three times more coverage, 120 inches in the three papers. His name, unlike
Martin's, was always associated with the coverage of the nominating speech.
A comparison between the differences in the valuative commentary also
reveals disparities. Cuomo received much more attention. The Chicago Trib
une is the only paper of the three that made any comment about Martin's
performance as a speaker. Both she and Cuomo are praised as giving "ring
ing" speeches and commentary is made about the positive responses the
crowds gave each speaker (Madigan, 1992c, Section 1, p. 1; Madigan,
1992e, Section 1, p. 1).
The New York Times gave no evaluation of Martin's speech, her perfor
mance, or the crowd's reaction. On the other hand, the Times did predict
that Cuomo might be the most compelling TV event of the convention and
when referring to his performance asserted that he, "made an impassioned
case" (Toner, 1992b, p. A1). Cuomo was worthy of both pre- and post speech
coverage in the Times, yet Martin received none. If, according to the Tribune,
both received positive responses from their audiences, why was Martin ex
cluded from post-speech coverage in the Timesl Some of the coverage given
to Cuomo by the Times can by explained for two reasons: Cuomo was the
governor of New York and the Democratic convention was held in New York
City. Certainly the Times reported Cuomo's performance because of regional
interest. While Cuomo may have been of particular interest to those in New
York, the Times does have a national circulation. Both Cuomo and Martin
gave nominating speeches, a central role at each convention. Both are major
players within their party. The Times awarded enough importance to Martin's
speech to print excerpts from it. However, no connection was made between
the excerpts and Martin as a speaker. The lack of coverage given to Martin
seems inappropriate at best.
The Washington Post only evaluated Martin when linking her speech per
formance with that of Marilyn Quayle's. They "did their best" (Broder &
Marcus, 1992, P. A1), according to the Post, to show the problems with
Clinton, and both women had "toughly worded speeches" (Broder & Mar
cus, 1992, p. A35). These comments may have a complimentary focus. The
speakers did the best they could to attack Bill Clinton. However a compar
ison with Cuomo indicates that these comments are also a minimal compli
ment on the one hand and potentially patronizing on the other. Cuomo's
oratory, on the other hand was individually praised by the Post, "The Words
Were Cuomo's But The Moment Was Clinton's" (Dionne, 1992b, P. A10).
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Cuomo's "widely anticipated" (Walsh, 1992, P. A9) speech "brought down
the house" (Dionne, 1992b, A10) and was described as "fiery" providing a
"new level of excitement" (Walsh, 1992, p. A9). It was a "rousing nomi
nation speech" (Walsh, 1992, p. A9). While Martin and Cuomo were to
perform the same roles, they were treated differently in early convention
coverage and this treatment continued as the conventions unfolded.
Differences in headlines, the printed photograph space, and the valuative
commentary each speaker received displays a clear contrast between the
ways Martin and Cuomo are treated in the newspapers. Martin is less visible
and less praised than Cuomo. A larger newspaper sample over a longer time
frame may point to other individual, social, and cultural factors that also
explain these dramatic differences in coverage. However, it is important to
note that the comparison identifies a difference between coverage given to
women and men speakers.
Unequal Evaluation of Prominent Women and Men
Another critical difference in media coverage of women and men speakers
can be seen in how expectations were raised about their speaking and then
how the speeches were evaluated. Several speakers were advertised as great
communicators. Presentations by Mario Cuomo, Jesse Jackson, Barbara Jor
dan, Ann Richards, and Ronald Reagan were previewed in the Newspapers
as greatly anticipated: The Chicago Tribune caWed Jordan a "powerful speak
er" (Madigan, 1992a, Section 1, p. 12), the New York Times called Ann
Richards, "fiery" (Berke, 1992, p. B2) and referred to her 1988 speech when
she, "stole the show" (Toner, 1992a, p. A13), and the Times also spoke of
the "eloquent" Cuomo and predicted he would live up to his image (Berke,
1992, p. B2). The Times asserted that Jackson's speaking was so powerful
that he often, "stole the show" (Berke, 1992, p. B2), and the Tr/faune believed
that Reagan would live up to his "great communicator" reputation (Madigan,
1992d, Section 1, p. 1). With such wonderful previews, all speakers were
expected to be the emotional and rhetorical high points of the conventions.
As analysis of the language used when talking about these speakers reveals
that three speakers performed as well as, if not better than expected. Ac
cording to the papers, the three men, Cuomo, Jackson, and Reagan were
successful.
The Washington Post reported that Reagan's "fiery speech" (Kutz, 1992,
p. A15) was an "emotional high point" (Balz, 1992, P. A 18) on the floor of
the convention. The New York Times argued he was "eloquent still at 81"
(Apple, 1992, p. A13) and the Chicago Tr/bune spent several inches focusing
on the "brilliance" of his speech, which they believed "set the tone"
for the addresses that would follow (Madigan, 1992d, Section 1, p. 1).
Jackson also succeeded. The Times reported that his speech was "stronger
than anything yet" (Goodman, 1992, p. A8) and the Tribune said that it was
a "masterpiece . .. full of eloquence and vivid images" (Madigan, 1992b,
Section 1, p. 1). Jackson's effort was labeled the "most powerful speech at
the last two conventions" (Madigan, 1992b, Section 1, p. 5). The Post con
sidered it to be one of the most "emotional" speeches of the convention
(Dionne, 1992a, p. A1).
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Cuomo also lived up to his reputation. The Post judged his speech "fiery"
and determined that his "provided a new level of excitement" and was a
"rousing nomination speech" (Walsh, 1992, p. A9). The Tr/faune spoke of his
"ringing" (Madigan, 1992, Section 1 p. 1) nomination, and the Times felt he
"made an impassioned case" (Toner, 1992b, p. Al). All three males were
praised as eloquent speakers before their convention addresses and were
praised for their convention performances. They were represented as news
worthy.
Conversely, the two women did not perform as well as they were expected
to. Analyzing the language used when talking about Jordan and Richards
shows that neither women seemed to please their critics. Richards, who was
frequently described as the woman who broke the "glass ceiling," did not
match her fiery reputation. The Washington Post asserted that her remarks
were, "a far cry from her crowd pleasing key note speech in Atlanta" (Broder
& Edsall, 1992, p. Al). They claimed she "disappointed her fans" (Broder &
Edsall, 1992, p. A17). The New York Times also pointed to her past perfor
mance in Atlanta.
Jordan, who was the subject of a major story in the Post the day before
her speech, was criticized for a disappointing address. She "left thousands
with even fewer opportunities to cheer" (Broder & Edsall, 1992, p. Al). Both
women, unlike their male counterparts, did not achieve the excellence ex
pected from their performance.
Evaluation of women speakers was not only more negative than for men,
it was also less visible. Jordan and Richards received fewer reviews than
Cuomo, Jackson, and Reagan. While Jordan and Richards received five and
two reviews respectively, Cuomo, Jackson, and Reagan received nine, six,
and eleven. The women speakers failed to meet the expectations of previous
success and were evidently considered less worthy of evaluation. Indeed,
Jordan and Richards had less political and social prominence that these three
male speakers. However, it is significant to note that all five received almost
equal pre-speaking attention.
The Grouping and Comparison of Women
The third critical difference is that women were treated together while men
received individual attention. Both Barbara Bush and Marilyn Quayle re
ceived praise and significant attention for their speeches. They were featured
players. Vet, they were also set against one another when being evaluated.
The New York Times reported that "the audiences' applause was supportive
and enthusiastic, but Mrs. Quayle did not elicit anything like the frenzy that
greeted Barbara Bush's appearance" (Stanley, 1992a, p. A20). The day after
their speeches, the Times and The Washington Post ran stories asking women
around America for their opinions of both Bush's and Quayle's speeches.
These stories focused on which speaker had the better message for women
and the family values debate. The comparison is interesting and unusual.
Bush and Quayle are members of the same party. In addition, they were
speaking to the same audience on the same evening with a similar message.
Yet, when covered in the newspapers, they became competitors.
In addition to being treated as competitors, women were often grouped as
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a collective instead of being given individual attention. The Washington Post
commentary linked Lynn Martin and Marilyn Quayle, instead of giving them
separate coverage. In fact, the Post only referred to Martin when linking her
speech performance with that of Marilyn Quayle's. The comparison is unique
in the newspaper coverage of the conventions. Male speakers were not
placed in competition or compared with one another.
Discussing Women's Topics
Barbara Bush and Marilyn Quayle received more coverage than any other
women convention speakers. Women who talked about traditional political
topics received far less coverage. For example, Republican nomination
speaker Lynn Martin received about one half of the space accorded to either
Bush or Quayle.
While focusing most on Bush and Quayle, the media emphasized their mar
ital connections and their traditional political policy issues: child raising,
motherhood, and family values. Even though these women are considered
important and worthy of news coverage, they are not portrayed in ways that
show them exercising political power as speakers.
The Chicago Times anticipated that Bush's speech would be, "lively, fun,
family oriented, and nonconfrontative" (Povich, 1992, Section 1, p. 18). The
Washington Post explained that Bush gave a "conversation" and not a
speech, which had the theme of, "mom's apple pie-or to be non sexist-dad's
apple pie" (Shales, 1992, p. CIO). It had "very little content and virtually
zero controversy" and was "warm and cozy" (Shales, 1992, p. C1). Quayle's
topics were rarely mentioned. What was more important to the Times was
that she was "unHillary" (Stanley, 1992b, p. A7).
Women are clearly present in news coverage of the political conventions.
Yet, four main differences appear in the ways the media treated women and
men speakers. An obvious discrepancy exists between how women and men
speakers were covered. The female nomination speaker was less visible than
her male counterpart, women were praised for their oratory less often than
were men, and women were grouped while men were treated individually.
Those women who received significant media attention were not represented
as serious political spokespersons.
Valuative Implications for Contemporary Women Speakers
The results explained above indicate two different ways in which women
are highlighted as dependent: the disproportionate amount of coverage given
to women who are identified as spouses of important men and the photo of
Lynn Martin "getting assistance" at the podium (Daley, 1992, p. A1). In both
of these situations, women are portrayed with a need to rely upon men in
order to receive attention and accomplish tasks.
Barbara Bush and Marilyn Quayle receive a good deal of coverage. They
are visible, newsworthy, and significant. Yet media coverage focuses on the
fact that they have powerful spouses rather than focusing on their individual
experiences and accomplishments, which make them credible speakers. Be
cause of the lack of focus on women as individuals, the message seems to
be that Bush and Quayle have no important qualifications aside from being
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the wives of the President and Vice-President. Bush and Quayle's presence
at the convention is not portrayed because of their individual accomplish
ment and powerful oratory. Indeed, the speech of the President's spouse does
have a different purpose than a keynote or nominating speech. In the context
of the coverage of other women speakers, those who are not spouses, the
coverage given to these two women as spouses is significant.
Lynn Martin, on the other hand, did not speak at the convention because
of her spouse. She was present because of her accomplishments in the GOP.
However, Martin still did not escape the newspaper focus on dependency.
She was portrayed as dependent when at the podium. The first photograph
of Martin at the Republican convention coverage appears in the Chicago
Tribune. She is at the podium "getting assistance" with the microphone (Dal
ey, 1992, p. A1). No other photograph calls attention to any other speaker
receiving assistance in any of the papers during either of the conventions.
Other photographs show speakers practicing at the convention, but none
explain the situation in terms of getting assistance. One implication is that
Lynn Martin may be presenting a key speech at the convention, but she is
unable to do it alone. She is dependent on others to ensure that she is able
to perform. Of course, one photo of one speaker receiving technical assis
tance is not a significant enough event to assert that all women are devalued.
However, in the larger context of the coverage women receive, it is not an
all together insignificant photo.
In addition, the most visible women speakers are not portrayed as serious
political players. The women at the conventions who received the most cov
erage were those who talked about family values and traditional "women's"
topics. They are visible, but not granted a role as a public persuader on
issues important to performance of citizenship nor of wielding power in the
act (Campbell, 1989, p. 1-2). The women who spoke about the same topics
as their male counterparts—the economy, foreign policy, and national vi
sion—received substantially less coverage than the men or Barbara Bush and
Marilyn Quayle did. Yet Bush and Quayle were not highlighted as serious
players, but as "fun and noncontroversial" (Povich, 1992, Section 1, p. 18).
Media offers little coverage of women in the role of public citizen whose
words wield political power.
A paradox exists in the newspapers' coverage. If women speak about the
same political issues as their male counterparts, they are less visible than the
men. If women speak about "traditional women's issues" they receive cov
erage, but they are trivialized in terms of their importance in the political
arena. Women seem to have no viable options in which they can receive
public attention as serious and important public speakers.
Preservation of a speaker's words and a record of her or his oratory is
another sign of value. Campbell (1989) explains that nineteenth-century
women's oratory was not recorded or preserved because it was not consid
ered valuable. At that time most women were not perceived as serious speak
ers and their words were not preserved as significant. The experience of
nineteenth-century women provides an important context for understanding
the evaluation of these convention speakers. If contemporary women speak
ers are considered valuable, unlike their foresisters, their speeches should be
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recorded and presented in public media, particularly newspapers because
they are recorded, preserved, and easily accessible for viewing.
The newspaper coverage studied here leaves the impression that women
speakers are not important enough to evaluate, or if they are it is only be
cause they have failed to live up to expectations. The valuing acts of appraisal
and post-speech discussion are generally absent. This in spite of the fact that
a host of exciting and effective women speakers such as Carol Mosley Brown,
Diane Feinstine, Elizabeth Claser, and Barbara Boxer participated at the po
dium at the conventions. They did not receive coverage in the papers re
viewed.
Carole Spitzack and Kathryn Carter explain that when a few women excel
as public speakers they are considered exceptional and beyond the norm of
abilities of their sex (1987, p. 405). This analysis reveals an additional social
assumption: the few women who achieve prominence that parallels their
male counterparts' cannot maintain it for long. Richards and Jordan provide
excellent examples of the exceptional women who failed to maintain ex
cellence.
Finally, the grouping and comparing of women speakers signifies a lack
of social value. A speaker who is powerful has always been the individual,
single agent. Karen Foss and Sonja Foss argue that the traditional criteria for
rhetorical importance focuses on single speakers "significant communication
is produced by individuals" {1991, p. 2). A prevailing assumption in the
communication discipline has been that individual speakers are responsible
for the texts they create. Clumping speakers together for analysis and eval
uation diminishes the perception of the individual qualities and talents of
each speaker, thereby diminishing the speakers' significance.
Conclusion
This study of women speakers at the 1992 conventions provides evidence
that after almost two centuries of American women orators women are, in
many ways, still devalued. One implication that this study and its findings
have for scholars and women is that women speakers still have few role
models.
It is true that women speakers were covered on live television and thus
did provide lively and admirable role models for women. However, while
the majority of Americans turn to television for daily, public information
(Allen, 1992), The New York Times reported that for the 1992 conventions,
network television coverage would be at an all time low (Kolbert, 1992, p.
B1). Coupled with the fact that the 1992 election year was termed the "Year
of the Woman" this makes the newspaper coverage given to women speakers
at both conventions extremely important. Newspapers became a primary site
covering the women speakers at the conventions. Thus, the medium provides
an important avenue for developing role models for women as public speak
ers.
We can conclude that newspapers provide a limited image of contem
porary women speakers. Little positive commentary is given to women
speakers as individuals. The newspaper coverage, which devalues contem
porary women speakers leaves us with few if any role models of women
39
et al.: Volume 34, Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, Fall 1996/Winter 1997/Spring 1997/
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato,
36 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
orators who speak on political issues. It is important to note, however, that
the value of women speakers had greatly improved since the efforts of wom
en who spoke in the 19th century.
The media coverage of the 1992 conventions suggests the conclusion that
women are unable to speak as well as men: they do not do it well consis
tently, they have to compete with other women for attention, we do not see
them do it as frequently as men, they need assistance when they speak, or
they do it only because of their husbands. Thus, we lack examples of women
speakers who speak well in public and receive individual positive coverage.
The absence of strong female role models for public speaking has impor
tant social consequences. Paula Kamen (1991) argues that strong female role
models are important in a society dominated by patriarchy, especially for
young women. Women currently have more lifestyle choices than ever be
fore, including political careers. Women who have succeeded in traditional
male domains serve as role models for "alternative" careers for women.
Because public speaking has primarily been a male domain, women who
have entered into the public speaking arena are important potential role
models (Spitzack & Carter, 1987, Foss & Foss, 1991). However, no positive
role models emerge from newspaper coverage of the 1992 Democratic and
Republican conventions for individual women who desire to speak on the
same issues as men.
An implication of this study is that dominant social attitudes toward con
temporary women speakers are influenced by the media's attitudes toward
and assessment of women speakers. Analyzing the media's portrayal of wom
en speakers is important because, as stated earlier, television coverage was
reduced and citizens may have been likely to look to newspapers for con
vention coverage. The readers of the newspapers may be influenced by the
media's attitudes. Thus, if the newspapers devalue contemporary women
speakers, it is plausible that readers in the larger mass society will adopt
and/or reinforce this attitude. It is important to note, however, that the de
valuing of contemporary women speakers is not a simple linear cause and
effect reaction. A combination of social factors, historical assumptions,
speaker reputations, and economic realities converge within the pages of our
popular media. Because society has historically devalued women's speech,
the media devaluation of 1992 female convention speakers simply reflects,
and at the same time reinforces, society's denigrative tradition. Thus, this
study shows how the long history of devaluing women speakers is continuing
even though more women are speaking today than ever before.
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COMPARING DEBATE JUDGES AND SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES:
AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN JUDICIAL
DECISION-MAKING
Jon Bruschke, William Trapani, Scott McWilliams,
Josh Zive
Baylor University
Law is a fascinating argument field and certainly one of the best worked-
out systems of argument. In fact, legal communication may be the most
prominent of all the objects of inquiry that have attracted the attention of
argument scholars (e.g., Dunbar & Cooper, 1981; Henket, 1987; Rohrer,
1981; Snedaker & Schuetz, 1985). In addition to the attention that it has
received from argument scholars law is, of course, a field in its own right
(e.g., Toulmin, 1958) that is prone to self-reflection and has thus developed
an impressive literature base of its own. Despite all this scholarly interest,
however, some of the most basic questions about the functions of law remain
unanswered. The most basic question of all may be "What makes judges
decide the way that they do?" and its answer has proven to be maddeningly
elusive. The thesis of this paper is that at least part of the elusiveness of the
question may be traced to a failure to integrate the communicative with the
contextual aspects of legal events.
Communication scholars have been interested in the study of law for some
time but modern approaches to law have been located, not surprisingly, in
the law schools. It is these legal theories that have been taken up by social
scientists of all persuasions. Early in this century the "mechanical" view of
the law held that the law was a self contained system, that the answer to
any particular case could be found in the extant law, and that the task of the
judge was to merely discover the correct legal principles and in an automatic
fashion apply those principles to the case at hand (Murphy & Tanenhaus,
1972). The legal realist movement rejected the traditional model beginning
as early as the 1920's (Cardozo, 1921/1964) and did so in such convincing
fashion that the inadequacy of the traditional model is no longer in serious
dispute (Schubert, 1964) even if it continues to find life in legal classrooms.
In general, most thinkers have come to believe that the task of judgment was
largely interpretive and thus subject to the normal range of human error
(Frank, 1930/1964).
With the mechanistic view so conclusively defeated, scholars turned their
efforts to attempts to explain how decisions were made if they were not
wholly grounded in the law. One approach, that may usefully be called
"behaviorist" or "functional" (see Cohen, 1935/1964, Lawlor, 1963/1964;
Loevinger, 1949/1964; Pritchett, 1948), sought to identify empirical regular-
This research was supported by a grant from Lee R. Polk and the Baylor Department
of Communication.
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ities in decisional behavior that were hoped to be capable of producing
useful predictions about how a given case was likely to be decided. While
legal theories certainly continued to abound, the attempts to explain judicial
behavior quickly passed to the social scientists, and the most prolific re
searchers were found in the fields of psychology, sociology, and political
science. A few attempts to study judicial "personalities," defined in classical
Freudian or psychological terms (e.g., Lasswell, 1948/1964) quickly died out,
perhaps for no better reason than not very many judges were willing to
submit themselves to psychological testing. The behaviorists then focused
their efforts on variables such as judicial attitudes, backgrounds, and role
orientations (e.g., Grossman, 1966; Goldman, 1971; Schmidhauser, 1964;
Ulmer, 1970).
Attention was expansively directed at a host of variables, ranging from a
judge's political affiliation or attitudes (Adamany, 1969; Allen, 1992; Barber,
1969; Beiser & Silberman, 1971; DuBois, 1988; Feeley, 1971; Goldman,
1966, 1979; Epstein, Walker, & Dixon, 1989; Hall, 1992; Nagel, 1963,1973;
late, 1981; late & Sittiwong, 1989; Ulmer 1962/1964; Vines, 1964; Walker,
1972), length of time on the bench (Dorff & Brenner, 1992; Drechsel, 1987;
Gaudet, 1964; late, 1991; Tate & Sittiwong, 1992), prior political activities
such as standing for office (Drechsel, 1987; Goldman, 1979; Ulmer, 1970;
Vines, 1964), occupation prior to becoming a judge (Baum, 1977; Goldman,
1979; Nagel, 1962; Tate, 1981), the region of the country in which the judge
was working (Aubert, 1963; Songer, 1992; Tate, 1981; Tate & Sittiwong,
1989), the judge's religion (Goldman, 1966; Nagel, 1962, 1986; Ulmer,
1970; Vines, 1964), the prestige of the judge's law school (Nagel, 1986, chpt
6; Tate, 1981), and even a judge's ABA rating (Nagel, 1962,1973), age (Gold
man, 1966, 1969; Schubert, 1977) and ancestry (Nagel, 1962/1964). Even
this list is not exhaustive (see Bruschke, 1994). Taken together, all these ju
dicial factors could account for only about 30 percent of the variance in
decisional behavior (Grossman, 1967). (While more optimistic assessments
have placed the value at around 60 to 80 percent [Tate, 1981] the figure has
been criticized [Bruschke, 1994].) Other work has focused on institutional
factors such as the prescence of intermediate courts, the residency of the
court, and deliberation procedures (e.g., Adamany, 1969; Baum, 1977; Hall,
1985; Hall & Brace, 1989; Murphy, 1966), or speaking most generally how
external factors such as socioeconomic situation, public opinion, or racial
composition of a state influence judicial behavior (e.g., Barnum, 1985; Ep
stein, Walker, & Dixon, 1989; George & Epstein, 1992; Hall, 1992; Link,
1995; Vines, 1964). More contemporary approaches in the behavioral tra
dition have shifted to decision theories (e.g., Benoit, 1989) or artificial intel
ligence models (Ragupathi, Schkade, Bapi, & Levine, 1991) in an attempt to
improve predictions. One of the more elaborate attempts to integrate all
these factors has been conducted by Brace and Hall (1995), who were able
to correctly predict between 64 and 70 percent of their cases.
Communication scholars, in the meantime, have similarly attempted to
understand legal behavior but their efforts have been somewhat more limited
although possibly more promising. Rather than seeking to continually refine
psychological and sociological models of legal decision-making communi
cation scholars have, by and large, focused on an entirely different class of
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factors that influence decision making. While background, psychological,
and sociological models all have powerful theoretical bases for their predic
tions, very few such models focus on the central object of legal behavior:
Argument making and evaluating. It is far too early to form any firm conclu
sions, but the early results suggest that there is a great deal to be learned by
focusing on argument variables. As will be reviewed in more depth shortly,
Bruschke's (1994) admittedly embryonic study of argument variables discov
ered that argument factors could predict judges' votes with 65 percent ac
curacy. This is almost exactly the same predictive power that non-argument
variables were able to obtain after a half-century of refinement. Before at
tempting to compare and integrate the two traditions, however, a quick re
view of the argument research is in order.
Argument has been problematic to define but its study includes, at a min
imum, the definition and analysis of a text's logical structure and logical or
narrative content. The argument-based research on the law to date generally
falls into two classes. One set of research draws on the rhetorical tradition
and tends to offer qualitative or critical assessments of arguments in law (e.g.,
Benoit & France, 1979; Feteris, 1987, 1993; Hample, 1979; Hasian & Croas-
man, 1992; Kienpointer, 1987; Klinger, 1981; Ling, 1981; Madsen, 1991;
Parker, 1981, 1987; Seibert, 1987; Schafer, 1981; Weithoff, 1985). A few
examples may clarify the direction of the work. Writing more as a legal
scholar than an argument critic, Alexy (1978/1989) has laid out an impres
sively broad theory of how legal argument functions including, for example,
the proposition that arguments must be answered. Feteris (1990, 1991) is a
more traditional argument scholar who falls very much into Alexy's abstract
genre. Soeteman (1987) similarly discusses broad precepts of interpretation
and legal usage. More focused efforts have studied the development of ar
guments over relatively long time periods in limited areas of case law such
as free expression and sex discrimination (Rieke, 1987; Newell & Rieke,
1986; Werling & Rieke, 1985). Still more limited efforts have applied argu
ment models to specific legal cases (Rabin, 1978; Snedaker, VanCott, Corn
wall, & McCarthy, 1987) or hearings (Wallinger, 1985).
This theoretical work, taken together, is all useful for the purposes of the
authors who wrote them. However, the sum of this work is not very practical
when trying to assess the overall contribution of argument factors in legal
decisions. Either the work is so broad, as is Alexy's, that it is very difficult to
operationalize or apply to specific cases, or it is so particular, as is Rabin's
work with the Griswold case, that it is difficult to generalize. Rieke's work
with free expression cases highlights both problems. On the one hand it is
particular to free expression cases and is thus difficult to generalize from.
On the other hand, the theoretical conclusions that Rieke draws—that the
court's behavior over the past century can be conceived of as a "reach test"
similar to the processes in a small group—is so broad that it is difficult to
apply to any specific case.
The second type of argument scholarship has been quantitative or quasi-
quantitative in nature (e.g., Parkinson, Geisler, & Pelias, 1983; Hollihan,
Riley, & Freadhoff, 1986; Lake & Keough, 1985). Riley, Hollihan, and Fread-
hoff (1987), for example, have studied in rather particular terms the argu
ments offered in small claims courts, Benoit (1981) has tried to link warrant
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usage's to case outcomes, Sheppard and Rieke (1983) have analyzed in detail
the closing arguments in civil trials, and Hiday (1983), who is not an argu
ment scholar, has done some excellent research on traditional argument vari
ables such as evidence use and presumption. Bruschke (1994) has been the
only attempt to date to compare a range of argument factor across a broad
range of cases. Even in that instance, however, many of the operationaliza-
tions (such as the simple counting of the number of references listed) are
charitably described as primitive.
This second set of argument studies have similarly been illuminating for
their purposes but are limited in that their foci have been narrow. Thus, the
central question, "Do judges make their decisions based on argument vari
ables?" has only been approached and certainly not answered with any clar
ity in a way that can be said to generalize beyond a particular area of case
law. To summarize the current state of knowledge, the traditional view of
the law has been roundly rejected and behaviorist attempts to replace it with
an alternative body of knowledge about legal decision-making have been
modestly successful at best. An alternative approach is to empirically study
argument rather than psychological, political, or sociological factors, but cur
rent efforts have been limited although promising. An important next step is
to find a way to test the argument model in a way that might have more
generalizability than current efforts.
Conception of Operations
Perhaps the largest barrier in argument research thus far has been the
difficulty in operationalizing what is meant by "argument quality." While it
is one thing to say that higher quality arguments will win more often than
arguments of lesser quality (and that argument quality might be a more de
terminant factor than, say, the judge's religion) it is quite another to put
forward a defensible definition of what makes a good argument. The problem
is that on the one hand, as Fritch and keeper (1993) describe, argument
scholars are almost universally interested in "discover[ing] truth as a product
of the valid form" (p. 186), while on the other hand scholars in general have
had great difficulty generating an epistemology identifying truth in any form
(Roth, 1987). A recent post-modern twist is that any claim to truth may in
advertently serve dominant interests. Cox (1993) summarizes the dilemma
well: "(1) we may fail to mediate difference or achieve a shared rationale
for action; or (2) we may in fact succeed but at the cost of being complicitous
with the dominant reason or common sense of a culture" (p. 11). There are
a host of solutions to these dilemmas, perhaps as voluminous as the list of
scholars who advance them, but the trend seems to be to seek methods that
fuse the logical components of arguments with their ethical, emotional, and
poetic features (see e.g., Fritch & keeper, 1993; Klumpp, 1990, 1993;
McKerrow, 1993; Nelson, 1991). As a result, any contemporary scholar
would be hard pressed to put forward a definitive definition of a "good"
argument, much less operationalize one into a coding scheme.
One possible solution to this dilemma is to have argument experts evaluate
court cases using the same materials that actual judges do and then see if
the decisions correlate at all. If, for example, argument specialists are given
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the same appellate briefs that the Supreme Court uses and then asked to
render decisions based on those materials it is reasonably clear that the
argument specialists would base their opinions on argument factors rather
than field-specific legal technicalities. The argument scholars, after all, would
have no special legal training. They would, however, be likely to base their
decisions on an argument specialists' definition of a better argument. If the
decisions of the argument specialists correspond to the decisions of the Su
preme Court the finding could be taken as evidence that the Supreme Court
is basing its decisions on argument factors. In more particular terms, the
correlation would be necessary but not sufficient evidence that argument
factors contribute to judges' decision making processes. This approach has
the further advantage of relying on naturally occurring behavior, which tends
to enhance external validity (Anderson, 1987). This study, then, will attempt
to correlate the decisions of the United States Supreme Court with the de
cisions of argument specialists.
Methods
NDT debate judges were selected as the argument specialists. Essentially,
debate judges attend intercollegiate debate tournaments and render deci
sions in a series of debate rounds. In addition to these responsibilities, most
NDT judges also work as coaches for some collegiate team. Most of the
debates are highly sophisticated and technical and often involve legal topics.
The 1994-1995 NDT debate topic, for example, concerned criminal pro
cedure. It is typical that debate judges base their decisions exclusively on
the arguments advanced and the strategic choices and technical prowess of
the teams in the round and try to render a decision based on the better
arguing rather than Platonic notions of the "correct" legal argument. (NDT
judges were utilized for the sake of convenience; there is no reason to as
sume that NDT as opposed to CEDA judges are more appropriate as "ar
gument specialists." Either group, in our opinion, would have adequately
tested the opinion of argument specialists against those of legal specialists.)
Four NDT debate judges served as the coders for this study. All four are
currently affiliated with the same university. One coder held a Ph.D. and all
coders had earned an undergraduate degree and were at least pursuing a
master's degree. All coders had been NDT debaters with at least four years
of undergraduate experience and all had advanced to elimination rounds at
the national championship tournament. Including the 1994-1995 debate
season, the coders averaged roughly 2.75 years of NDT judging experience.
By almost all standards the coders were highly qualified NDT judges.
The coders were all instructed to obtain their own copies of appellate
briefs of the United States Supreme Court cases. While this sampling pro
cedure was not optimal, there is little reason to assume that the cases se
lected would systematically include or exclude a certain type of case in a
meaningful way and thus the canons of random selection do not appear to
have been violated. The coders were instructed to avoid discovering the final
decision of the Supreme Court before rendering their own decision and were
instructed not to read the arnicas curae briefs that often accompany Supreme
Court decisions. As a result, the coders were exposed to the appellant brief,
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the respondent brief, and the appellant reply brief. The coders were instruct
ed to resolve the court decisions in the same manner that they would resolve
a debate round, which might include keeping a flowsheet of the arguments.
The task of coding the cases proved to be more time-consuming than
initially estimated. The final sample included 25 Supreme Court cases. Each
coder processed roughly the same number of cases, around seven. One case
was inadvertently coded by two coders; both coding decisions corresponded
to the Supreme Court decision. The case was scored as an agreement be
tween the Supreme Court an the argument specialists and was counted only
once in the final analysis.
Results
Of the 24 cases, the argument specialists agreed with the Supreme Court
in 13 cases and disagreed in 11.
Discussion
The results did not support the thesis that the decisions of argument spe
cialists correspond with the decisions of legal experts; although the NDT and
Supreme Court judges agreed more often than they disagreed the differences
were far too slight to justify any conclusion that the decisions are similar. In
fact, although no statistical test was conducted, the results are only one de
cision different from perfect random chance. At least three explanations can
make sense of this finding. First, argument quality might not influence de
cisions of the Supreme Court judges. Second, the correlation might exist but
NDT judges might focus on criteria other than "argument quality." Third, the
decisions of the Supreme Court might be so unique that they do not mirror
the patterns of court decision-making in general.
The first possibility is that argument quality does not influence the deci
sion-making of judges. It would seem premature to accept this conclusion.
The present study was based on only 24 court decisions and the opinions of
only four argument experts. While the evidence does not confirm the hy
pothesis it also seems inadequate to dismiss it entirely. In addition, the dif
ferences were not significant but were in the correct direction: The Supreme
Court and the argument specialists agreed more often than they disagreed.
Finally, the Bruschke (1994) study, which was based on a much larger num
ber of cases, was able to find significance for argument factors. Perhaps the
best course is to define more clearly what is meant by a quality argument.
The present study attempted to approach the issue indirectly by assuming
argument specialists would rely on an implicit definition when rendering an
opinion but the attempt was unsuccessful. Rather than reject the approach
entirely it seems more prudent to seek more refined operationalizations of
what it is that constitutes a good argument. The conclusion that can be based
on the data in this study is that, whatever the extent of the influence that
argument has on legal decision-making, it cannot be measured when oper-
ationalized only as the decisions of NDT judges.
The second possibility is that argument factors might indeed influence
legal decisions but that the decisions of NDT judges are too peculiar to that
activity to operationalize adequately a "good argument." There are many
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reasons that the decisions of NDT judges might not measure argument qual
ity. Collegiate debaters tend to speak at incredibly rapid rates that are com
mon to no other activity. This might mean that the best NDT judges are those
with the best verbal information processing abilities, not necessarily those
best able to sort out volumes of written legal arguments.
In fact, the oral orientation of intercollegiate debate might make it very
different from the analysis of written arguments. While NDT debates are
predominantly oral with some reliance on written materials (a judge might
examine a debater's evidence after the round has concluded). Supreme Court
decisions are weighted in exactly the opposite direction with written mate
rials forming the bulk of the argument and verbal communication extremely
limited. Advocates are allowed only roughly 10 minutes to argue orally be
fore the Supreme Court while their briefs might encompass thousands of
pages. In short, the absence of a correlation might indicate that decisions
are based primarily on oral communication tend to be quite different from
those based on written communication.
Another difference might be that NDT judges are more prone to base their
decisions on technical or purely strategic issues than are Supreme Court
judges. For example, it would be unheard of for an NDT judge to vote on
evidence not offered in a debate round while a Supreme Court judge would
be expected to discover and apply the relevant case law even if it was never
mentioned in legal briefs. Intervention is expected of court judges but
scorned in NDT circles. In addition, debate judges typically focus on stra
tegic issues, such as "dropped" arguments in rebuttal speeches, while a Su
preme Court judge might hold a legal brief to a lower standard of the cov
erage of the issues if the point had been conclusively argued. In fact, post-
coding discussions among the coders revealed that it was difficult for the
NDT judges to make decisions because the briefs were "all too good" and
no brief contained a technical error that made the decision easy. This is to
be expected; lawyers arguing before the Supreme Court have months to work
and staffs to prepare briefs while debaters have fewer than ten minutes to
prepare their speeches.
In sum, the debate judges might very well have been basing their decisions
on argument quality while the Supreme Court judges were doing the same,
but the factors that make an argument a quality argument might have been
weighted differently for the two groups. While "coverage" is certainly a stan
dard of argument quality (Alexy, 1978/1989), it might be much more im
portant to NDT judges than Supreme Court justices. Alternatively, while the
standards of argument quality might remain constant for oral and written
arguments, style might be much more important for oral than written com
munication. All told, argument quality might very well influence legal judges
but in different ways than are attended to by NDT debate judges.
The third possibility is that Supreme Court decisions are different from
those of most other courts, and thus it may be the case that most courts are
basing their decisions on the argument factors of a case while the Supreme
Court is not. Most legal decisions are made by lower courts, state courts,
small claims courts, tax and patent courts, and other sorts of courts that
handle the vast majority of legal work that is done in the United States. The
United State Supreme Court is a relatively unique body. It has the discretion
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to select the cases that it wants to hear while most courts do not. In addition,
it is the only court that renders decisions that will bind all other courts. This
gives it a unique responsibility in forming good law. Thus, the Supreme Court
might be less concerned with argument quality than other courts. For ex
ample, the Supreme Court might decide to hear a case because it wants to
over-rule the decision of an earlier Supreme Court. In that instance the re
spondent would have a better argument, grounded in the precedent of the
very court that is hearing the case, while the Court is hearing the case pre
cisely in order to ignore those arguments and find for the plaintiffs. Thus,
while most courts may be persuaded by the better argument, the Supreme
Court may have its collective mind made up before it ever reads the legal
briefs.
An alternative explanation is that the Supreme Court has a clerical staff
and research resources that other courts do not possess. It might therefore
be better able to find its own precedents and thus rely less on the legal briefs
than other courts. Finally, only the very best paid lawyers are likely to appear
before the Supreme Court and thus the arguments are always likely to be
very close. Indeed, the Supreme Court may choose to hear a case because
the arguments are so good for each side. This may contrast with the cases
that most other courts hear where the argument quality might be more lop
sided. The Supreme Court, therefore, might be more likely to make difficult
value choices where neither side enjoys a clear argumentative advantage
whereas other courts are more prone to decide cases based solely on the
arguments.
There are many limitations to this project. The sample size was very small
and many of the key terms of argument quality were left un-defined. In
addition, no attempt was made to assess the reliability of the NDT judges'
decisions; it thus remains possible that NDT and Supreme Court judges do
make similar decisions but the particular group of NDT judges selected for
this project do not produce reliable decisions. In the end, it is best to view
the results here as the provocative products of a very exploratory endeavor.
This paper does not have the data or the space to identify conclusively
which of these three possibilities (or others) accurately describe the reasons
that NDT judges' decisions do not correspond to those of the Supreme Court
judges. All appear to have merit and should be explored in future research.
What can be said is that this paper represents one of the first attempts by
argument scholars to explore the relative importance of argument, broadly
defined, on particular case outcomes. After nearly a century of efforts that
have focused on psychological, political, or sociological explanations for
court behavior, research that focuses on the primary function of courts—
evaluating arguments—is long overdue. This paper has not been able to dem
onstrate a correlation between the decisions of argument and legal experts;
however, it has refined the discussion and suggested fruitful future directions.
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MAKING SENSE OF THE 1994 RIGHT-WING
REVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES: HOW
THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT, THE GRAND OLD
POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (GOPAC),




University of Arkansas at Monticello
Political campaigns are designedly made into emotional orgies which en
deavor to distract attention from the real issues involved, and they actually
paralyze what slight powers of cerebration man can normally muster.
James Harvey Robinson
The Human Comedy [1937]
The overwhelming COP victory in the 1994 midterm elections represents
a seismic shift in the American political structure. Tacit House passage of
the Contract with America is evidence enough, alone. After gaining eight
seats in the Senate and fifty-one seats in the House in midterm elections
(Staff, 1994), Republicans positioned themselves to dominate political dis
course through the 1996 elections. Indeed, in spite of President Clinton's
lopsided victory over his COP challenger. Republicans have managed to
maintain their control over the House and Senate and dictate much of the
legislative agenda. No longer considered the majority party. Democrats now
struggle to make sense of the frightening, chaotic, and bleak political land
scape. To date, most analyses of the 1994 elections found in the popular
press have focused exclusively on Newt Cingrich and his much-celebrated
Contract (Rosenthal, 1995a; Feldmann, 1995). However, our article seeks to
provide a more panoramic investigation into the COP's successful campaign
to retake Capitol Hill. Withstanding Cingrich's obvious draw as a media
caricature, it is our position that he could not have independently fomented
such a massive shift.'
While an explication of every trend that contributed to the Republican
victory—including the swelling anti-incumbency sentiment, concerns over
immigration and crime, and theories of complacency within the Democratic
party—is beyond the scope of this article, we examine three significant rhe
torical forces that merged to shape the November 1994 elections: tbe Chris-
' It may be argued that the era of the so-called "therapeutic speakership" (Peters,
1990) may be over. While House Speaker New Cingrich promised during his inau
guration to conduct a dialogue with Democrats, the partisanship that has divided the
post-reform House grows unabated (Rohde, 1992; Sinclair, 1983). This phenomenon
is reelected by the "guerilla warfare" employed by Gingrich to destabilize the Dem
ocratic majority of the eighties and secure his rise to power (Rohde, 1991).
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tian Right, the Grand Old Political Action Committee (GOPAC), and talk
radio. We do not seek to personify these factors as Ralph Reed,^ Newt Gin
grich, and Rush Limbaugh, however. We instead regard them as co-depen
dent and ultimately convergent forces that will influence a generation of
America's political, economic, and cultural life. In short, we feel that the sum
of many rhetorical efforts is greater than its representative parts. Thus, we
introduce the concept of propaganda convergence.
What is Propaganda Convergence Theory?
To explain and demonstrate propaganda convergence theory, it is neces
sary to first review the trends in propaganda research preceding this article.
Our general critique addresses the tendency towards an overly narrow focus
in many of these essays. A specific example of this issue emerges in a theme,
suggesting that domestic propaganda is an oxymoron. We find, however,
that a certain international impulse historically guides propaganda research
in speech communication. For example, the Nazi Party's uses of propaganda
during World War II have received attention in various textbooks and pub
lications (Bytwerk, 1978; Dower, 1986; Rhodes, 1987; Nagy, 1990). Nu
merous scholars have dissected the Kremlin's use of "mind-control" propa
ganda, especially during the Reagan years (Orwant, 1972; Symms and Snow,
1981; Leventhal, 1984; Marlin, 1987; Bugajski, 1987; Kampf, 1987; Woz-
niuk, 1989). Speech communication scholars have also analyzed propagan-
distic appeals in: China (Wang, 1972); Europe (Bytwerk, 1988; Gross, 1989;
Jakubowicz, 1992); Iraq (Jowett, 1993); Latin America (Ignasias, 1971; Kieh,
1990); North and South Vietnam (Hoffer, 1974); and South Africa (Washburn,
1989). Our international tendencies are also evidenced not only by artifact,
but also by method. Lindahl (1983) and Drescher (1987), for instance, pro
vide detailed procedures for academicians interested in international prop
aganda analysis. Perhaps this emphasis may be attributed to an assumption
on the part of United States (US) speech communication scholars, and there
fore their journals, that international events are somehow more intriguing
than domestic phenomena. Indeed, some might argue that international
propaganda provides a more stimulating site of analysis. We hold that an
increase in domestic study and discipline-specific publication must counter
balance this bias.
Of course, some studies on domestic propaganda activities do exist. How
ever, most of these works are either timeworn (Weatherly, 1971; Rogers and
Clevenger, 1971; Wolvin, 1971; Clark, 1975; Gunter and Taylor, 1973), or
while being recent, reflect an overly historical perspective (Sproule, 1989).
Our communication journals of late provide little insight into the domestic
propaganda perspective. Accordingly, this article repeats the enthusiastic call
to domestic propaganda research previously expressed by Jowett (1991),
McKerrow (1991), and Jowett (1987). Propaganda is a pervasive form of com
munication that does not exist solely in countries undergoing political tur
moil.
^ Since the completion of this essay, Ralph Reed has left his leadership position in
the Christian Coalition.
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While scholars must fill this domestic void, we must avoid the common
flaw of artifactual unidimensionality. None of these works evaluate propa
ganda from the multi-perspective of a convergence or unity of efforts. Cutting
against this habitual convention apparent in the literature, we argue that
propaganda, generically defined as "the propagation of ideas and actions"
(Combs and Nimmo, 1993, 12), can be a collective effort. We believe that
the intrinsic criteria used to evaluate a singular entity's propagandistic rhet
oric can be exploded to include the rhetorics of several organizations acting
consciously or unconsciously in tandem.' In other words, we believe that
more than just one agency or rhetor may participate in a synthesized cam
paign of propaganda.
The Propaganda Convergence Thesis
Because the propaganda convergence theory is without a formal prece
dent, we faced the challenge of reviewing the various literatures on propa
ganda to detect what elements were common in speech communication
definitions of propaganda. As a result of this inquiry, three basic elements
which define propaganda clearly emerged: the intentional use of information
to promote a cause (criterion A); the intentional use of information to injure
an oppositional cause (criterion B); and controlling or attempting to gain
control over the medium through which these two strategies are propagated
(criterion C). Our propaganda convergence thesis holds: that one or more
agencies must fulfill all of the above elements of propaganda for true prop
aganda to exist. A synthesis of efforts would, indeed, satisfy these specific
criteria. Accordingly, we next detail the propagandistic convergence of the
Christian Right, GOPAC, and Rush Limbaugh's paralleling political agendas
in the 1994 elections."
Explaining the Republican Revolution: The Christian Right,
GOPAC, and Talk Radio
To honor criterion A of propaganda convergence theory, at least one of
the agencies taking part in a co-mingled propaganda campaign must frame
information so that it promotes a positive agenda or cause. Voters must have
something virtuous or altruistic to which they can gravitate. The positive
agenda, ethically referred to as the highroad approach, is an essential com
ponent of political propaganda; without it, propaganda cannot exist. One
cannot distinguish the negative without the positive; good and evil are prop
agandistic counterparts and necessities.
' This effort is informed by Baxter's (1992) dialogic understanding of communica
tion which rejects monological approaches towards communication research. Draw
ing from Bakhtin, Baxter proposes a perspective that "is comprised of both fusion
with and differentiation from, both centripetal and centrifugal forces" (p. 335). Rather
than dissect agents as isolated factors to be studied and manipulated by traditional
methodologies, we attempt to unpack the convergence of forces created by their
multi-dimensional interactions.
Recalling that Connelly and Pitney (1994) predicted that "the right constellation
of forces" would be necessary for the GOP to win an outright majority in November
1994, the authors believe this application of the propaganda convergence theory to
be appropriate.
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The Christian Right, GOPAC, and talk radio ail offered their versions of
the Truth. Ail of these groups used positive appeals and negative attacks to
operationalize these visions of Truth. However, of the three primary rhetor
ical agencies actively participating in the 1994 Republican campaign to take
the House and Senate, none were as pronounced with their proactive ap
peals to the electorate than the Christian Right.
The Christian Right: Foot Soldiers for God and the Republican Fbrty
The 1992 presidential election represented a mini-epiphany for the Chris
tian Right—a powerful force in US politics that had been growing since the
Reagan Revolution of the early eighties. The race provided this group the
opportunity to make explicit a good versus evil dichotomy and, in the pro
cess, define themselves in broad strokes as a mainstream alternative. Later
in this article, the unique nature of that concept will be further addressed.
Because of their fundraising prowess, get-out-the-vote drives, and middle
class demographics, local, state, and regional candidates joined them to
stand on a solid pro-life, pro-"family values" platform. Admittedly, they had
little choice in the matter—the Christian Right had become the most creative,
organized, and dependable source of votes in the Republican party. Despite
conjecture that a small group of ideological Christian extremists rhetorically
"hijacked" the 1992 Houston convention and consequently derailed the
Bush campaign's bid for the presidency, their influence only grew (Daley,
1994; Feldmann, 1994; Shogan, 1994). During their September 1994 strategy
conference, members of the Christian Coalition (the most vocal and well
organized force in the Christian Right) pledged to move into mainstream
politics without losing voters over divisive issues like abortion. At the con
vention, a flock of Republican presidential hopefuls attended to increase their
visibility with this segment of the party "because its members are among the
most loyal Republican voters and foot-soldiers" (Keeping the faith, 1994).
Their efforts translated into an extraordinary campaign. In its "most am
bitious voter outreach ever for a midterm election," the Chesapeake, Virginia,
based Christian Coalition distributed thirty-three million voter guides cover
ing each Senate and gubernatorial race and 350 House races and phoned
two million homes in their election day drive to get out the vote (Goodstein,
1994, A1). On the state level, the Texas Christian Coalition deluged their
state during the 1994 season with more than two million brochures called
the "pro-family voting guide" (Ratcliffe, 1994). These guides predominantly
focused on secular issues like taxation and term limits. The national cam
paign to distribute voters' guides and maintain phone banks cost the Chris
tian Coalition approximately two million dollars (Fulwood, 1994). However,
the strategy of issue-rather-than-candidate advocacy gave the Coalition re
markable flexibility and was essential for the group to avoid certain federal
campaign restrictions.
Though there was little evidence of the kind of stealth-campaigns that the
Coalition ran in 1992, its methods—particularly its voters' guides—continued
to garner controversy. Rather than explicitly support candidates, the Coali
tion's "guides and get-out-the-vote campaigns are ostensibly nonpartisan,
meaning the amount spent does not have to be disclosed to the Federal
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Election Commission" (Carney & Barrett, 1995, 32). While Coalition repre
sentatives compared their campaign with strategies practiced by the League
of Women Voters, Democrats claimed that they were misleading and ille
gally partisan (Foskett, 1994; Christian Coalition runs into flak, 1994). And
for the first time, the coalition faced an organized religious opposition from
another clergy group, the interfaith Alliance (Goodstein, 1994).
Any doubts about the effectiveness of the Christian Right's campaign meth
ods were dispelled as election results poured in. Ralph Reed, executive di
rector of the Coalition, was quick to claim credit for much of the Republican
Party's stunning performance in the November elections (Stevens, 1994). In
deed, a Coalition survey found that "religious conservatives accounted for
one third of the national vote, overwhelmingly for Republicans" (Keeping
the faith, 1994). Additionally, the Christian Coalition claims that forty-four
House electoral victories could be attributed to "pro-family, pro-life" groups
(Washington, 1994). McCraw (1995) cites a University of Akron study which
found that the Christian Right "played a significant role in 120 congressional
districts" (p. 54).^ While the actual impact may be smaller, there is little
reservation that the GOP and the religious right have discovered common
ground in accusing Democrats of ignoring the economic and spiritual needs
of the middle class. Here the larger theme of this article gains support. By
employing nontraditional, issue-oriented methods, the GOP's campaign out
flanked the Democratic Party through the construction of a proactive plat
form and gained a commanding lead in shaping the national agenda. This
platform meets the primary criteria required for propaganda synthesis.
Criterion B of the propaganda convergence theory states that an agency
must also use information in a strategically detrimental fashion against an
opposing cause. In order to distinguish the propagandistic agency's advo
cated truth from other competing, lesser truths, political organizations fre
quently employ negative attacks. Argumentum ad hominem, argumentum ad
populum, the intentional use of disinformation, and demonization are just a
few of the derogatory methods employed by the propagandist. As with cri
terion A (positive appeals), each of the rhetorical agencies possessed their
own arsenal of injurious rhetoric. Yet, none were as naked with their verbal
aggression as GOPAC.
GOPAC: An Intellectual and Financial Armory
GOPAC played a significant role in the 94 elections by recruiting, edu
cating, and funding Republican candidates at the local, state, and federal
level. Gingrich began using the political action committee as a platform to
advance his vision of a GOP revolution after its founder, former Delaware
governor Pierre "Pete" DuPont, left it to launch his 1988 bid for the presi-
^ Dr. John Green, the researcher responsible for this study, reminded us in personal
correspondence that "quantifying Christian Right involvement in campaigns is very
difficult because so much of it is at the grassroots, highly informal, and information
about it is closely held" (1995, p. 1).
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dency.'' Before the explosion of press coverage concerning Gingrich and his
Contract With America, GOPAC sponsored seminars and mailed thousands
of text and tape-based lessons to aspiring candidates "instructing them on
how to do in liberal opponents" (Barrett, Carney, & Tumulty 1995, 31). Using
his organization to funnel nearly $8 million since 1991 to Republicans who
preach his kind of conservatism, Gingrich has called GOPAC "the Bell Labs
of GOP politics" (Balz and Kovaleski, 1995, 13). Using all manner of media,
Gingrich has created a virtual cult of personality—not with the general elec
torate—but within his own party's farm of contenders. We hold that Gin
grich's strategy of providing support to potential GOP candidates was essen
tial for his successful run for the Speakership at the beginning of 1997. In
deed, one can argue that his beltway support is more important than that
support found in his home district.
As polling data suggests, Gingrich's rapid ascendence (Russakoff, 1995)
and consolidation of power (Hook, 1995; Staff, 1995) are due less to his
mercurial rhetoric and confrontational style than to his work behind-the-
scenes as a conduit to power for Republican hopefuls. Borger (1995) illus
trates the results of Gingrich's efforts by noting that "of the 75 new GOP
members, 33 have been fed talking points by Gingrich's GOPAC" (29). Since
Gingrich was elected Speaker of the House, the impact of his political action
committee has been felt even more. After directing more lines of power
through his offices and promoting GOPAC allies to powerful positions in the
House, "congressional scholars believe that Mr. Gingrich has arrogated more
power to himself than any speaker since Joseph Cannon" in the first years
of this century (Staff, 1995, 24). Canon served between Nov. 9, 1903 and
March 3, 1911. Rather than being shaped by the institutional setting of the
House of Representatives (Peters, 1990, 287), Gingrich has used GOPAC to
reshape the institution.
As a means to power for Republican hopefuls, GOPAC bypassed both
traditional financial requirements and rhetorical guidelines. Despite repeated
pleas from House colleagues, Gingrich refused for years to reveal the PAC's
financial backers (Cummings, 1994a). He argued that the unique nature of
the organization precludes the need for public accounting: "Mr. Gingrich's
aides argue that federal campaign laws do not require GOPAC to disclose
anything but the spending it undertakes on behalf of candidates for federal
office—about 10 percent of its outlays" (Mr. Gingrich's stealth PAC, 1994,
A20).' GOPAC represents the future of political fundraising—it coordinates
local, state, and regional elections along a national agenda, making the most
junior candidate a standard bearer for the party's larger agenda.
<• It must be recalled that GOPAC Is the culmination of efforts by the so-called new
right which experienced its first zenith with the nomination of Barry Goldwater in
1964 (Rae, 1989). From Goldwater to Reagan to Gingrich, this movement has leveled
sharp criticism towards moderate Republicans.
' Even though GOPAC eventually relented to releasing the names of their contrib
utors, they did so with unique provisos. The list only included individuals who con
tributed from November 17 1994 through the end of that year. Adding to this limi
tation, GOPAC "required those wishing to inspect the list to come to the group's
Washington headquarters and refused to allow tnem to make photocopies" (Gingrich
group, 1995).
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Similarly, GOPAC has served as a training ground for the rhetorical meth
ods of a new generation of Republicans. Rather than emulate the low-key,
collaborative style of former House minority leader Bob Michel, GOPAC has
taught its beneficiaries to define themselves in stark dichotomy against Dem
ocrats by using ad hominem attacks and divisive language (Adams, 1990;
Oreskes, 1990). In fact, "a 1990 document entitled 'Language, a Key Mech
anism of Control,' offered a list of . . . negative words 'to define our oppo
nents.' The first word was decay" (Balz and Kovaleski, 1995, 13). A St. Louis
Post-Dispatch editorial (A sling it yourself manual, 1990) printed another
quotation from the document that noted, "the words and phrases are pow
erful . . . Read them. Memorize as many as possible" (C2). GOPAC designed
this strategic use of emotion-laden language to strengthen the resistance of
the faithful against the allegedly "liberal media" (Adams, 1990, 56-58). In
advocating this tactic, GOPAC advocates a rhetorical trait common to the
three forces examined in this essay: it bypassed traditional media and meth
ods to reach an alienated audience. Further, the group satisfies the second
component of our propaganda convergence theory by promoting an injuri
ous means of rhetoric.
Criterion C of the propaganda convergence theory holds that rhetorical
agencies create, possess, or will attempt to gain control over the mediums
through which their positive and negative messages travel. This ensures prop
agandists that their message is being transmitted purely, without competing
interference. While "feeding soundbites" to independent reporting agencies
was an effective strategy (Adams, 1990), many preferred the direct route to
mass exposure offered by talk radio.
Talk Radio: The Mouth that Roared
Talk radio was the medium that amplified the collective message in 1994,
and its biggest mouth was Rush Limbaugh (O Neil, 1994; Kurtz, 1994). A
self-styled entertainer who states, "my success is not determined by who wins
elections, my success is determined by how many listeners I have" (1992,
22), Limbaugh was, in that election year, a significant player in national
politics. Former Congressman Vin Weber says that Rush "is as responsible
as anyone else for the GOP victory" (Corliss, 1995, 22) while during a De
cember 1994 dinner for new Republicans coming to Congress, Limbaugh
was hailed as "the Majority Maker" (Seelye, 1994). While he is not the only
conservative talk show host with national influence, Limbaugh represents the
convergence of forces this article seeks to examine. His close connection to
GOP heavyweights translates into considerable political power. For example,
after Limbaugh warned on his syndicated radio show that Republican resolve
[to pass a balanced-budget amendment that required a three-fifths super-
majority to raise taxes] was waning, Gingrich called him privately to reassure
him—and his fifteen million listeners—that the Contract With America would
be honored (Rosenstiel, 1995b).
However, as stated above, Limbaugh is only a metaphor for the larger
theme, an alternative to traditional media that addresses a large and angry
segment of the electorate. David Nyhan notes that "radio talk show hosts
tend to draw callers who are male, frustrated and angry at blacks, immi-
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grants, liberals, welfare mothers and Hillary Clinton among other things"
(1994, 19). Culver adds that Christian radio broadcasting has entered the
arena to represent people frustrated with "big government. President Clinton
and public education" (1994, 12). Though Ralph Reed ties Republican suc
cess to his Christian Coalition, he is quick to state that "talk radio was one
of the reasons for a power surge ... by white evangelical born-again Chris
tians" (Lambrecht, 1994, B5). Beyond political classifications, the influence
of this medium is immense. According to a 1993 poll by the Times Mirror
Center for the People and the Press, 44% of Americans named talk radio as
their chief source of political information (Corliss, 1995).
The empowering influence of talk radio flows both ways. As listeners use
the medium for political education and edification. Republican strategists
strive to harness the collective anger of millions of middle class Americans.
Newt Gingrich, in particular, routinely rejects overtures by mainstream tele
vision news programs and even his hometown newspaper while "turning to
talk radio, cable TV and proven conservative allies whom he trusts to faith
fully convey his message" (Cummings, 1994b, 5b). Since assuming the
Speakership, Gingrich has extended credentials and even floor space in the
Capitol building for talk radio hosts to broadcast their programs (Dowd,
1995a). The symbiotic relationship between Gingrich and what he calls the
'alternative media' was sealed in September 1994 when the Republican Na
tional Committee organized 300 talk-radio interviews for Contract with
America signatories and "many hosts read [pro-Contract statements provided
by the GOP] verbatim on the air" (Corliss, 1995). Here again, the Republican
Party bypassed traditional methods by appealing directly to the voters, using
the emotional language, spiritual values, and high technology.
GOD, GOPAC, and GAB—The Postmodern Trinity?
By now it is well known that Newt Gingrich considers himself a futurist.
He has taught the principles of Peter Drucker, extolled the optimism of John
Naisbitt, and even developed "policy" with Alvin and Heidi Toffler. Thus, it
is no surprise that he has recently turned to the much-touted bypasser of
bureaucracy, the internet, to reach his voters of the 21st century (Dowd,
1995b). Fineman argues that "Newt propounds a world in which blast faxes,
modems, satellite feeds and talk radio are the dedicated lines to the voters
they wants to reach" (1994, 41). His vision for America is illustrated by the
concept of hyperdemocracy—an information-driven society that risks con
fusing knowledge, wisdom, and passion in the blender of cyberspace dis
course (Cole, Dickers & Reingold, 1995). However, the lessons of 1994 cen
ter on power and how the GOP benefited from a convergence of forces to
gain it.
The Christian Right, GOPAC, and talk radio played essential and compli
mentary roles in the Republican Congressional victory. This is not to suggest
that some grand overarching strategy was responsible for the outcome in
1994. Indeed, the independent nature of these parties would render such a
conclusion most suspect. The question emerges: how shall we understand
this convergence? We note that several dimensions provide common ground
among the three elements of this propagandistic convergence: interpersonal
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relationships that inspired coliaboration, shared need that inspired logistical
coordination, and a sense of cultural conflict that inspired philosophical al
liance. Yet, no single political agent could expect to create such a conver
gence, only to exploit one for limited aims. Claims otherwise merely serve
the purpose of simplification. We propose, instead, that propaganda con
vergence is made possible by the overlap of rhetorical spaces-unique senses
of marginality experienced by specific groups-that form a brief center. Var
ious individuals may claim ownership of the center, as they did in the 1994
Republican victory, but none could maintain it. Part of the power of this
convergence is the sense of alienation felt by each group. The Christian Right
defined itself as distinct from a cultural wilderness. GOPAC sought to revi
talize a relatively weakened party. Talk radio provided a voice to individuals
who felt disenfranchised.
The sense of alienation that provided common ground to these elements
provided a space in which individual voices received validation in a shared
context. However, victory in the midterm elections eliminated much of what
motivated that context. The struggles experienced by each of these groups is
a testament to the ephemeral nature of the propagandistic center. Speaker
Gingrich, to be sure, is aware of the limited power of immunity provided by
the temporary nature of his popular acclaim. While discussing the separate
agendas of Ralph Reed, Newt Gingrich, and Rush Limbaugh was necessary,
this article has argued that the unique convergence of their collective efforts
required closer scrutiny than the individual accomplishments of these peo
ple. As GOPAC drew strength from disenfranchised Christian voters who
gained inspiration from talk radio that has earned the respect of Beltway
insiders, the cycle that has led to a revolution is vicious or virtuous—de
pending on the reader's political persuasion. Partisanship aside, powerful
forces and individual voices clearly found a shared space of discourse in
1994. And while the vote counters have defined the political ramifications,
we are only now discovering the social implications of this powershift.
From this effort, a clear implication emerges. Unpacking this powershift,
along with similar shifts, demands a macro-level, broad approach that is
sensitive to the interconnected nature of agents which contribute to move
ments. A clear limitation to this study is that it was, perhaps, too compre
hensive in scope; missing critical details which, on the whole, were as influ
ential as the proposed rhetorical totality. In response, we note the difficulty
that follows an attempt to develop guiding themes in a complicated phe
nomenon such as a political campaign. Theoretical attempts to pull strands
from the fabric risk unraveling any sense of coherence, often resulting in
conclusions which lack utility. While we sought to ground our meta-ap-
proach in the exigencies and strategies of the campaign, we take responsi
bility for the necessarily interpretative nature of our conclusions. Surely, other
uses of this approach will address this methodological quandary more di
rectly. A fruitful direction for inquiry might examine the use of propaganda
in literature and media to perpetuate dominant positions or resist them. Either
way, we suggest that further research into the nature and application of prop
aganda convergence take these questions as challenges: Can we view prop
aganda as the organic result of multi-layered structure and connection, or
must persuasive messages be assumed to emit from explicitly individual
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sources? Must the selection of elements studied in propaganda convergence
research emerge from a deductive method, or can the selection emerge from
a grounded reading? Finally, should the interpretations which follow this kind
of analysis attempt a process of prediction and control, or can we find value
in their ability to make sense of divergent purposes? By now, we have made
our intention clear; rather than assume a managerial approach towards the
explication of propaganda, we believe that communication scholars view
this phenomena as a process defined by co-creation and transcendence.
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The entire cold war era has evoked much scholarly interest, but the main
focus of cold war research is on what historians term the "origins of the cold
war." They seek to understand who or what caused the cooperative wartime
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union to collapse. The
largest body of research falls into two major areas: the orthodox position and
the revisionist position. The orthodox position places "blame" for the dete
rioration on the Soviets, while the revisionists view the places "blame" on
the Truman administration, james V. Compton summarizes the orthodox po
sition in America and the Origins of the Cold War:
In brief. Orthodox historians see the cold war as an American response to
an objective condition in postwar international affairs—the expansionist ten
dencies in the Soviet foreign policy which threatened the survival of liberal
institutions and of American security interests in Europe.'
Compton also summarizes the revisionist position: "The revisionists . . . view
the situation as an American provocation of the Soviet Union caused by
either a gross misreading of the Soviet policy or an insensitivity to legitimate
Soviet anxieties and security interests."^
Two revisionist studies deal with anti-communist attitudes directly. Athan
Theoharis in Seeds of Repression and Richard Freeland in The Truman Doc
trine and the Origins of McCarthyism charge that Truman created anti-com
munist attitudes in the public mind because he used a divisive polarizing
style of language to frighten the public into accepting the Truman Doctrine
and the Marshall Plan. Freeland argues:
The essential energies of postwar anti-Communism were fully developed by
early 1948. . . . These emotions were aroused and these patterns of belief
developed ... as a result of the deliberate and highly organized effort by the
Truman administration in 1947-1948 to mobilize support for the program of
economic assistance to Europe ... or the Marshall Plan."
Athan Theoharis also focuses on the Truman administration as being the
creator of anti-communist rhetoric in the postwar period:
This change in national opinion [anti-communist attitudes] was in great part
shaped by the rhetoric of the Truman administration. In the period of 1945-
1949—that is, before Senator McCarthy's Wheeling speech—the Truman ad-
' James V. Compton, Ed., America and the Origins of the Cold WarfBoston: Hough-
ton Miffin Co., 1972), p. xiii.
^ Compton, p. xiii.
" Richard Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarathyism (New
York: Knopf, 1972), p. 5.
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ministration conducted foreign policy debate along narrowly anti-communist
lines. To secure support for its containment policy from 1947 through 1949,
administration rhetoric vastly oversimplified the choices confronting the na
tion."
This paper arrives at conclusions quite different from the revisionists. While
Freeland and Theoharis find Truman to be the creator of the simplistic cold
war approach, my research indicates that before the oversimplified rhetorical
style was adopted by the Truman administration, this same oversimplified
style was presented by an anti-communist popular press. The anti-communist
popular press included many popular right wing periodicals. In this study
the anti-communist popular press sources surveyed were: William Randolph
Hearst and his newspaper group. Col. Robert McCormick and the Chicago
Tribune empire, Henry Luce and Time-Life Inc., and Dewitt Wallace and the
Readers Digest.
Current studies of anti-communist attitudes suffer from one major weak
ness—the focus on the presidency to the exclusion of all other possible in
fluencing factors, such as an anti-communist popular press. This exclusive
presidential focus is consistent with prevailing assumptions about how for
eign policy is formed and disseminated to the general public. These as
sumptions are best exemplified by James Rosenau's work, Public Opinion
and Foreign Policy. Rosenau's first assumption concerns the president's ex
clusive power to control public opinion on foreign policy questions and the
second concerns the "mass public's" effect on foreign policy decisions.^
The first assumption focuses on the president as the primary source of the
mass public's information about foreign policy. While there are many groups
that have access to specific information about domestic matters there is much
less expertise in foreign policy. As Ralph Levering states in his book American
Opinion and the Russian Alliance:". . . few people have personal knowledge
of other nations and their foreign policies. . . . Only those at the highest levels
of government expect to have access to state secrets; thus, almost everyone
is dependent upon public officials and other 'experts' for information about
foreign affairs."*"
The second assumption focuses on the mass public's relationship to the
decision making process. Rosenau describes the mass public as responding
to emotional tones, as setting outside boundaries for the president: "Thus
their response to foreign-policy matters is less one of intellect and more one
of emotion; less one of opinion and more one of mood, generalized, super
ficial, and undisciplined feelings which easily fluctuate from one to anoth
er."^
" Athan Theoharis, of Repres Seeds sion, Harry Truman and the Origins of McCar-
thyism (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), p. 8.
^ The "mass public" is a term developed by James Rosenau, in Public Opinion and
Foreign Policy. (New York: Random House, 1961). He differentiates between the mass
public, those who are unconcerned and uninformed about foreign policy, and from
the "attentive public," those who are well informed about foreign policy. The mass
public is seventy to ninety percent of the population. Anti-communist popular press
publications are aimed at the mass public.
*" Ralph B. Levering, American Opinion and the Russian Alliance, 1939-1945
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1976), p. 11.
' Rosenau, p. 36.
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The Rosenau assumptions about the president's role in the formation of
public opinion and foreign policy are frequently applied successfully when
the president is the major source of information about an issue. This paper
has found, however, that on the anti-communist issue the two Rosenau as
sumptions are only partially applicable.
Assumption 1: The president is the major supplier of information about for
eign policy issues."
In this case, the Truman administration was the major supplier of infor
mation about specific issues related to the Soviet Union; at the same time,
an anti-communist popular press was supplying a highly emotional rhetorical
view of the Soviet Union. This view was continuously presented to the mass
public from 1944, when the Soviet Union moved into the countries of Eastern
Europe, through the end of the war in 1945, through the period when the
Truman administration adopted the anti-communist rhetoric in the Truman
Doctrine Address in March 1947.
Assumption 2: Since the mass public responds to emotional tones, their
views on foreign policy issues fluctuate easily from one extreme to another.'
This assumption did not prove to be accurate when applied to anti-com
munist attitudes in the postwar era. Although the anti-communist press' pre
sentation was emotionally based, not based on substantive issues, the atti
tudes did not fluctuate easily from one extreme to another but remained
stable." Furthermore, the anti-communist press' presentation was well suited
to the mass public's behavior patterns.
This paper reveals that the mass public's continuous and unchanging ac
ceptance of anti-communist rhetoric had serious consequences for the Tru
man administration. The Truman administration found that it could not con
trol anti-communist issues in the same way that it could control other issues.
The President found himself in a type of "rhetorical trap." The mass public
still was not concerned about specific issues, but the mass public firmly
believed the rhetorical framework of the Soviet "evil." While the President
was still free to choose policy specifics, he found that it was necessary to
present these programs to the mass public through the already accepted
rhetorical structure of anti-communist devil theory. The anti-communist
press' continual presentation had the consequence of limiting the rhetorical
options available to the Truman administration on all issues related to com
munism.
This paper contends that the mass public's influence has been underesti
mated because the mass public's anti-communist views were only "rhetori
cally" limiting. Since the mass public's anti-communist views were not lim
iting the Truman administrations options on the specifics of postwar policies,
the influence has been seen to be insignificant. This paper will examine three
areas: 1) The anti-communist popular press presented a highly emotional
and restricted view of communism that was continuous and appropriate to
the mass public's behavior patterns. 2) The Truman administration was forced
® Rosenau, p. 35.
^ Rosenau, p. 36.
" Leverlng's research based on anti-communist attitudes during World War II finds
that the mass public's attitudes did not fluctuate, but remained stable.
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to adopt the anti-communist press' rhetorical structure to gain passage of the
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. 3) Once the rhetorical structure was
adopted, the Truman administration's foreign policy had to be conducted
from within the restrictions of the anti-communist rhetorical structure, a lim
itation which had negative long term consequences.
Anti-communist Presentation is Continuous and Has Mass Appeal
An examination of the anti-communist press' presentation reveals a highly
oversimplified and frequently inaccurate presentation, with the Soviet Union
shown to be barbaric and capable of destroying family, religious, and per
sonal freedoms. Both the right wing popular press and the Catholic Church
viewed their anti-communist crusades as a mission. Both groups believed it
was their duty to use their publications to inform the mass public about the
evils of communism.
The mission of the right wing popular press was based on several definite
ideals. One of the main ideals was the value the publishers placed on pa
triotism and the ways they chose to define a "patriotic American." All four
publishers, Hearst, Luce, McCormack and Wallace, were outspoken sup
porters of the "American" free enterprise system.
An important aspect of these publishers' definition of patriotism can be
traced to the influence of the Protestant work ethic. The acceptance of the
belief that the "good man in God's eyes was the successful man" can be
seen in all four men. Luce and Wallace were both the sons of Presbyterian
ministers; Hearst and McCormick's families also provided a strong Scotch-
Irish Protestant influence. William Swanberg discussed the effect Calvinism
had on the formation of Luce's attitudes in his book, Luce and His Empire:
"Hence the man of God should be a successful man, whatever his under
takings. Luce made free enterprise and world success into a religious creed.
The good man was a successful man.""
Even though Hearst and McCormick came from wealthier families, they,
like Luce and Wallace, viewed themselves as self-made men, men who sin
gle-handedly created enormous empires. As a part of their definitions of
patriotism, these publishers had a great fascination with the hero figure. Their
"hero" was the epitome of the frontier man. In The Foreign Policy of Col.
McCormick's Tribune, Edwards speaks of McCormick's equation of heroes
with the American experience: "McCormick's greatest heroes in American
history were those who, like Lincoln and Grant, rose from a lowly station in
life thus demonstrating the opportunities inherent in the free enterprise sys
tem."!^
These men viewed the United States as the center of the world, with all
other governments revolving around it. McCormick "insisted that the Amer
ican Revolution had a greater meaning than being a mere struggle for in
dependence ... the single most important event in world history."" Luce
" William A. Swanberg, Luce and His Empire {New York: Dell Publishing Company,
1972), p. 154.
"Jerome Edwards, The Foreign Policy of Col. McCormick's Tribune, 1929-1941
(Reno, Nevada: University of Nevada Press, 1991), p. 16.
" Edwards, p. 16.
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reflected this view of the United States as the center of power in his essay,
"The American Century," where he called for the United States to take its
rightful place in world affairs^''
Another important aspect of their personalities was their rigidity on polit
ical issues. While they had strong opinions about the importance of patri
otism, these strong opinions led them to narrow definitions of patriotism.
Therefore, all those who disagreed with them were viewed as unpatriotic.
As Edwards described McCormick: "McCormick was a sternly patriotic man
who denied patriotism to those who disagreed with him, an important reason
he made so many enemies."'^ These men could not consider any differing
opinions as reasonable. This made their view of communism predictable.
Communism was clearly antithetical to their restricted definitions of Ameri
can patriotism; therefore, communism was not only wrong, it was evil. Any
one who did not agree that communism was evil was also wrong, probably
sympathetic to communism and evil as well. As Edwards said of Mc-
Cormick's strict definitions: "McCormick sincerely believed that almost ev
erybody who was not conservative republican was tinged with commu
nism."""
Given the personalities of these publishers, their aristocratic beliefs, their
confidence in the correctness of their opinions, coupled with the potential
power wielded by their publishing empires, it is understandable that they
would use their influence to defeat their perceived enemy. For these men,
fighting communism was not just a convenient tool to gain public attention
or to increase the circulation of their publications. To them anti-communism
was a true crusade, and they cast themselves as the type of heroic figures
they believed should carry out this crusade. Their strong belief in this mission
made the unmasking of the evils of communism a major priority in their
publications. This sometimes meant that accuracy was sacrificed to present
their point of view.
The anti-communist press' definition of communism unveiled a type of
devil theory. In religious terms, the supreme evil is the devil. The Christian
connotation of the devil is a powerful one. The devil is believed to be the
enemy of God with powers to inflict bodily harm and spiritual corruption
on man. By equating communism with the religious connotations of the
devil, the anti-communist press developed a rhetorically powerful associa
tion. In "The Devil and Soviet Russia," Harold J. Berman stated; "There is a
strong strain of Puritanism which tends to turn opponents into enemies, en
emies into devils and devils into ugly monsters."'^ The anti-communist press
was successful at making their devil, communism, a "monster."
This devil became vivid and tangible through the use of standard tech
niques of sensationalized journalism. One approach was the use of exag
gerated and oversimplified language; another was the use of reoccurring
article formats, like the expose, convert testimony, or an insider report. An-
Henry Luce, "The American Century," Life 10 17 February, 1941, p. 65.
Edwards, p. 14.
" Edwards, p. 106.
" Harold J. Berman, "The Devil and Soviet Russia," The American Scholar T7
Spring 1958, p. 147.
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other technique was the heavy reliance on political cartoons. While many
of these techniques could be used to sensationalize any subject, when used
to present the devil theory of communism, the techniques became rhetori
cally powerful.
For maximum effect, the anti-communist press used rhetorical symbols to
strengthen its position. When an audience immediately understands that a
single word embodies specific meanings, the user needed only utter that
word to evoke the desired response. The rhetorical symbols chosen by the
anti-communist press helped to strengthen the idea that communism was
evil. Richard Weaver, in Ethics of Rhetoric, called these symbols with neg
ative connotations devil terms, terms which could be depended upon to
produce the hate response:
A singular truth about these terms is that . . . they defy any real analysis. That
is to say, one cannot explain how they generate their peculiar force of re
pudiation. One only recognized them as publicly agreed-upon devil terms.
.  . . However one might like to reject such usage as mere ignorance, to do
so would only evade a very important problem.'®
The word "communism" itself became a powerful devil term in the United
States at the time of the Russian revolution and remained such in the postwar
period. Other devil terms, such as "red," "red fascist," "Yalta," "appease
ment," "fellow traveler," "Stalin," and "iron curtain" were also synonymous
with the communist evil. When the anti-communist press described someone
as a communist, the entire meaning of the devil theory accompanied the
description.
To a mass public susceptible to the techniques of sensationalist journalism,
the view of communism had a strong impact for two reasons. First, the pub
lications of the anti-communist press were able to reach a large audience at
a time when a strong view of the Soviets was not being presented by any
other source. And more importantly, the emotional nature of the devil theory
message was appropriate to the way the mass public responded to issues.
To begin, the anti-communist press' interpretation became more influential
by the fact that it was able to reach large audiences. Their publications had
the largest popular circulations of that era. At the same time, there were no
other publications presenting a more moderate view of the Soviets with
enough circulation to effectively challenge the devil theory impact on the
mass public." At the end of the war, the Truman administration had not yet
'® Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), p.
223.
"The Reader's Digest, with a circulation of 8,000,000 and Life magazine, with a
circulation of 5,352,868, had the two largest circulations of popular periodicals. There
were seven magazines presenting devil theory in the top fifty listed magazines. The
other magazines with large circulations were women's magazines, comic groups. The
Hearst Press was the largest newspaper chain at that time, with a daily circulation of
5,344,201 and a Sunday circulation of 8,783,213. The two daily papers with the
largest individual circulation were the New York Daily News with a daily circulation
of 2,343,484 and a Sunday circulation of 4,765,721 and the Chicago Tribune w\lh a
daily circulation of 1,058,627 and a Sunday circulation of 1,582,656. Both of these
papers were Patterson-McCormick papers. The Chicago-Tribune was the most influ
ential paper in the midwest.
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adopted devil theory rhetoric. In the immediate postwar period, the Truman
administration publicly maintained a rhetoric of friendship with the Soviets,
which implied continued cooperation between the two countries. With the
death of Franklin Roosevelt, there was no other prominent person with
enough credibility to present a moderate public position.
In addition to being the only major public interpretation of postwar events,
the anti-communist press' presentation was continuous, which gave the anti-
Communist press the ability to shape the mass public's anti-communist at
titudes. The events of postwar Europe, especially the Soviet occupation of
Eastern Europe, resulted in a large number of news events which could be
interpreted through the devil theory biases [List of events which triggered the
devil theory response is included in the Appendix].
The continuous presentation was an important factor that helped the anti-
communist press control the mass public's view of communism. An even
more significant factor, however, was the nature of the presentation itself.
The devil theory could easily be absorbed without study. It was not necessary
for the mass public to become informed about the specific foreign policy
issues to receive the full meaning and power of the anti-communist press'
presentation. The anti-communist press' use of the presentational methods
previously discussed, especially methods which oversimplified events, meant
that the reader did not have to be dedicated to extensive study of the peri
odical to be receptive to the intended message. The anti-communist press'
use of the headline, the political cartoon, and the appropriately placed article
title could immediately establish the devil theory message when no articles
had been read or understood. The anti-communist press' use of the devil
term in the article title or headline, for example, could quickly achieve the
desired response. Notice the headlines which appeared in the Hearst press
at the time of the Iranian crisis in January-March 1946; "REDS ENGULFING
IRAN." and "TURKS-REDS NEAR BORDER."^" As Swanberg said of Time
and Readers Digest's approach, "They catered to the intellectual laziness of
people seeking quick and easy wisdom rather than informed discussion."^'
Not only was the anti-communist press the mass public's only major source
of information about communism during this time, it presented the message
so efficiently that the mass public could receive the emotional message with
out exerting much effort.
Finally, the anti-communist press was able to have a great influence on
the mass public because the type of information presented by the devil the
ory had a personalized appeal. The vivid images of the destruction of family,
church, and personal freedoms seemed more relevant to a family than did
many of the specific postwar issues. It was difficult for a person to easily
identify with the administrations' daily wrangling over issues, such as war
reparations or territorial disputes. However, it was easy to identify with the
emotional images of pain presented by the anti-communist press. Any of the
postwar pieces of evidence which included actual characters in danger pro
duced great public empathy for these characters. The mass public could feel
"Reds Engulfing Iran," Headline, Pittsburgh Sun Telegraph 13 March 1946, p. 1;
"Turks-Reds Near Border," Headline, Pittsburgh Sun Telegraph 14 March, 1946, p. 1.
Swanberg, p. 162.
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an identification with these characters on a personal, emotional level, with
out ever having to know about or understand the complexities of the postwar
politics they represented.
The anti-communist message was so successful because its presentation
made the fear of communism a tangible fear; the devil theory presentation
transcended the level of government squabbles to the personal level. The
success of this message also forced the Truman administration to conduct its
foreign policy from within the context of this anti-communist framework.
Truman Administration is Forced to Adopt Devil Theory Rhetoric
By the end of the war the Truman administration, as well as other influ
ential government officials, like Arthur Vandenberg, had come to realize that
a return to pre-war isolationist policies was impossible.^^ The United States
and the Soviet Union had emerged from World War II as the two major
surviving powers. With the British and French economies in shambles, the
United States inherited the position of anti-communist world power. Europe
was virtually destroyed. The Truman administration realized it would take
tremendous financial and military commitment to rebuild Europe to a posi
tion of strength. There were few within the administration who questioned
the importance of a rebuilt Europe, for a strong Europe was important to the
United States for economic as well as military reasons. The difficult questions
were how and when could the Truman administration persuade the mass
public and Congress that aid was necessary. The Truman administration
could not hope to pass any type of European aid program without public
support.
Not only did the Truman administration have the problem of persuading
the mass public that aid to Europe was necessary, it first had to cope with a
history of isolationist tradition. Although the Truman administration realized
that the United States must assume a new role in world affairs, the mass
public was not ready to accept expanded responsibility.
The anti-communist press' rhetorical presentation did not help prepare the
mass public to accept any new postwar responsibility since the anti-com
munist position fit perfectly with overall support for isolationist policy. At a
rhetorical level, the anti-communist press had taught the mass public that
the Soviets were evil. However, the anti-communist press did not prepare
the mass public to accept any type of material commitment to support their
rhetorical position. In fact, just the opposite was true. The anti-communist
press taught the mass public to oppose commitment. Therefore, the Truman
administration had to deal with a public making loud rhetorical demands
that Truman "get tough" with the Soviets, but still so isolationist that it could
not see the necessity of any financial or military commitment abroad. As
John Caddis noted in his book. The United States and the Origins of the
Cold War: "Getting tough with Russia involved responsibility as well as rhet-
" Senator Arthur Vandenberg was ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Re
lations Committee and the most influential Republican on foreign affairs.
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oric, and government leaders could not hope to accomplish their objectives
without educating the public to that fact.""
The Truman administration came to accept the difficult educational task
before them. As Joseph Jones, public relations director for the Truman ad
ministration stated:
I think we must admit the conclusion that Congress and the people of this
country are not sufficiently aware of the character and dimensions of the
crisis that impends, and of the measures that must be taken in terms of relief,
gifts, constructive development programs and liberal trade policies—all of
these on a scale hitherto unimagined—if disaster is to be avoided. ... "
Although it is not unusual for a president to have to educate a mass public
on the specifics of foreign policy issues, the Truman administration discov
ered that on all issues related to communism the problem was complex.
When explanations of the economic issues of postwar aid were explained
in economic or humanitarian terms, the mass public ignored the arguments.
The Truman administration soon learned that when the specific information
was presented in the already—accepted rhetorical structure used by the anti-
communist press, the mass public and Congress were more supportive.
The Truman administration learned of the significance of the devil theory
rhetorical style through several early "tests" when Winston Churchill was
asked to give the commencement address at Westminster College in Fulton,
Missouri. The speech became known as the "Iron Curtain" speech. The Chur
chill speech can be viewed as having two levels, a policy level and a rhe
torical level. On the policy level Churchill asked for a type of military alli
ance of non-communist countries to guard against the Soviet threat. [NATO
eventually fulfilled this need.] On the rhetorical level Churchill depicted the
Soviets in the same simplistic terms used by the anti-communist popular
press during this time. He popularized the term "iron curtain" as symbolic
of Soviet evil, a term which was adopted by the anti-communist press: "From
Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended
across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states
of central and eastern Europe."" While there was a strong applause for the
rhetorical tone of the speech, the alliance aspect was strongly rejected. The
trial balloon informed the Truman administration that the mass public was
not yet ready to make a military commitment to Europe.
However, at the same time in early 1946, the Truman administration was
faced with a second test, a request from the British for a financial commit
ment in the form of a three quarter billion dollar postwar loan. The Truman
administration began its campaign to gain support for the British loan with
logical arguments. Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson reported on the
strong economic reasons which made the British loan necessary. He noted
" John Lewis Caddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 317.
" Jones' conversation to Assistant Secretary of State Benton, February 26, 1947, as
reported in Caddis, p. 346.
"Mr. Churchill's Address Calling for United Effort for World Peace," The New
York Times, 6 March 1946 p. 4.
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the United States needed foreign markets, and the British loan would help
to insure this, but as Caddis stated:
In a series of speeches Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson repeatedly
tried to picture the loan as part of a larger situation—the necessity to revive
world trade—but without much success. In the end Congress approved the
loan chiefly because the administration said it was necessary to fight Com
munism."
The fact that the Truman administration had little success in selling the British
loan by using economic arguments is important. The British Loan fight set a
precedent for the Truman administration and also taught them that anti-com
munism, or the rhetoric of devil theory, was the one approach that caused
fear in the Congress as well as in the mass public.
The Truman administration had not used devil theory language in a major
speech in public; but as the crisis in Greece and Turkey approached in early
1947, Truman himself would be forced to use devil theory language to assure
passage of the Truman Doctrine. It is at this point that this paper differs from
the other research in this area. Freeland and Theoharis claim that Truman
artificially created the rhetorical crisis by choosing to create divisive anti-
communistic rhetoric.^^ This paper contends that Truman did not create this
rhetorical structure; Truman was forced to adopt the rhetorical structure that
had proved to be so successful for the anti-communist popular press. The
mass public's belief in the evil of the Soviets dictated the rhetorical form
Truman would have to use to gain passage of legislation requiring any kind
of commitment to Europe.
By early 1947, the Truman administration had only been able to achieve
a small financial commitment, the loan to the British. However, conditions
in Europe were deteriorating. There was special concern about the future of
Greece and Turkey. From the end of the war, the British had primary re
sponsibility for these two countries. However, rumors were numerous that
the British intended to pull out of the area. It was assumed by most western
powers that if the British pulled out, Greece would "go communist."^® On
February 21, 1947, a British message reached the State Department declaring
that the British could no longer financially carry the responsibility of Greece
and Turkey and that they would end all their responsibility by March 31,
1947. The British hoped that the United States would assume the task.
The State Department immediately began calculating estimates and plans
for this assumption of responsibility. They compiled reports estimating costs,
as well as forming strategy proposals, in considering how to approach the
Congress and the public. By February 24th, preliminary reports were given
to Secretary of State Marshall. On February 26th, the President, the Secretary
of State, and the military Chiefs of Staff all agreed that the situation was
" Caddis, p. 343.
Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism, and Theoharis,
Seeds of Repression, Harry Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism.
It was assumed by all major decisions maker in 1947 that the communist threat
in Greece was a real one. While more recent research has strongly questions this
assumption, the cold war atmosphere of 1947 did not allow for any doubt about the
overwhelming communist influence in Greece.
77
et al.: Volume 34, Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, Fall 1996/Winter 1997/Spring 1997/
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato,
74 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
highly serious, and that the United States must fill the vacuum created by
the British withdrawal or it would be filled by the Soviets. On February 27th,
Truman invited a bipartisan group of Congressional leaders to the White
House to discuss the Greek crisis. Again, at this meeting, Truman learned
that only the devil theory rhetoric had a chance at success.^"'
Secretary of State Marshall was assigned the task of educating the con
gressional delegation about the significance of the United States' new re
sponsibility and the financial package that would be needed to assume this
responsibility. Marshall began by discussing economic conditions in Europe,
but as Caddis reported: "Marshall's dry, laconic presentation failed to im
press the suspicious Congressmen."^"
At this point. Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson asked to speak. Just
as Acheson had vividly presented the British Loan arguments in devil theory
terms, he framed the current crisis in the same rhetorical terms. According
to Caddis: "The Undersecretary of State painted a vivid picture of a world
divided between irreconcilable ideologies. . . Acheson described the pre
sentation in his memoir. Present at the Creation:
I said, Soviet pressure on the Straits, on Iran, and on northern Greece had
brought the Balkans to the point where a highly possible Soviet breakthrough
might open three continents to Soviet penetration. Like apples in a barrel
infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran to all
the east. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt,
and to Europe through Italy and Erance, already threatened by the strongest
domestic Communist parties in Western Europe. The Soviet Union was play
ing one of the greatest gambles in history at minimal cost. It did not need to
win all the possibilities. Even one or two offered immense gains. We and we
alone were in a position to break up the plan."
All first-hand accounts of this meeting acknowledge the impact of the
ideological presentation. After a few moments of silence Senator Vandenberg
replied: "Mr. President, if you will say that to the Congress and the country,
I will support you and I believe most of its members will do the same."^^
Therefore, the administration set itself to the task of writing a speech which
would accomplish three goals:
1. prove that the Soviet threat was serious;
2. demonstrate that only the United States could handle the threat; and
3. establish that it would become basic U.S. policy to accept the respon
sibility for this type of Soviet threat.
In addition to these points, the Truman administration also determined that
" This perspective is reported by Joseph Jones, Fifteen Weeks (New York: Viking
Press, 1955) and Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton
and Company, Inc., 1969).
Gaddis, p. 349.
Gaddis p. 349.
" Acheson, p. 219.
"Acheson, p. 219. Eric Goldman in The Crucial Decade, p. 59, reports a more
dramatic response, "Mr. President, if that's what you want, there's only one way to
get it, that is to make a personal appeal before Congress and scare the hell out of the
country."
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the speech would be phrased In the ideological terms of good and evil7'' In
other words, the Truman administration planned to use basic devil theory
language.
President Truman presented the Truman Doctrine before a joint session of
Congress on March 12, 1947. The speech focused on all three stated goals
and was phrased in the ideological terms of good and evil. The speech first
demonstrated that the threat was serious: "The very existence of the Greek
state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed
men led by the communists, who defy the government's authority.""
The speech also demonstrated that only the United States could give
Greece the necessary aid: "The United States must supply that assistance.
We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic
aid but these are inadequate. There is no other country to which democratic
Greece can turn. No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary
support for a democratic Greek government.""'
The speech also articulated the new general policy which became known
as the Truman Doctrine, the policy which committed the United States to
assist any country fighting communist domination:
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside
pressure. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own
destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through
economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and or
derly political processes."
Not only was the Truman speech successful in including the new foreign
policy goals, the speech was also clearly based on the anti-communist press's
general assumptions about the Soviet Union: Soviet communism was mon
olithic, expansionistic, and barbaric. It was the use of these general assump
tions that gave the speech its power over the mass public and Congress, not
the articulation of the new policy direction. The speech held more power
over the mass public precisely because it did not present new forms of belief,
but instead, served to reinforce already established beliefs.
The beliefs that the Soviet Union was the center of communism, and that
communism was monolithic, were never stated directly, but the underlying
assumptions were implicit in the content. When Truman noted the terrorist
activities along the Greek borders, he assumed that these activities were
directed from Moscow. The speech also articulated the assumption that So
viet communism was expansionistic, i.e., the Soviet Union would move into
any spot, Greece in this instance, because the Soviet goal was world dom
ination. Just as Dean Acheson explained the "rotten apple" position to the
congressional leaders, Truman explained the importance of the Greek lo
cation in the speech:
It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity
of the Greek nation is of grave importance in a much wider situation. If
" Jones, p. 146.
" "The Truman Doctrine," p. 177.
" "The Truman Doctrine," p. 177.
" "The Truman Doctrine," p. 178.
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Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon
its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and dis
order might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.'®
The speech also exhibits the position that the Soviet system is barbaric,
and seeks to destroy family, church, and personal freedoms. It is this portion
of the speech that most successfully illustrates the goal of presenting the
situation in ideological terms, the "good" United States versus the "evil"
Soviets:
At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose
between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One
way of life is based upon the will of the majority and is distinguished by free
institutions, representative governments, free elections, guarantees of individ
ual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political op
pression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly
imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled
press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms."
After establishing that the Greek-Turkish situation was a real crisis, a crisis
that could only be solved by the United States, as the representatives of
"good," Truman asked congress to make a financial and military commit
ment: "I therefore ask the congress to provide authority for assistance for
Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400,000,000 for the period ending
June 30, 1947.'""'
At first, administration insiders like Joseph Jones were shocked at the quick
success achieved: "It has all gone like clockwork. . . . Two months later, the
measure had passed both houses of Congress by resounding majorities and
was awaiting the President's signature. Considering the political situation at
the time the action appears not amazing, but unbelievable.""'
While the mass public could not accept an expanded United States' role
in world affairs for economic or even humanitarian reasons, when the role
was explained in the language of devil theory, a belief system already ac
cepted, the response was positive.
The Adoption of Devil Theory Rhetoric has Negative Consequences
While it may have been necessary for the Truman administration to adopt
the anti-communist press' rhetorical position to gain passage of the Truman
Doctrine legislation, this adoption was to have short term as well as long
consequences.
From the strong public support for the Truman Doctrine policy, it would
appear at first that the President's choice was a wise one since the choice of
the ideological position insured public support for the expanded Truman
administration commitments. It also assured public support for the Marshall
Plan. Once the mass public began to view the European situation in terms
of the commitment necessary to stop the evils of communism, it became
easier to pursue commitment on a larger scale. If the Soviets were such a
' "The Truman Doctrine," p. 1 79.
' "The Truman Doctrine," p. 1 78.
' "The Truman Doctrine," p. 179.
' Jones, p. 146.
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threat to Greece and Turkey, then it stood to reason that the Soviets would
be a proven threat in all of war-devastated Europe.
The passage of the Marshall Plan was a major victory for the Truman
administration, and the Presidential endorsement of devil theory language
had helped lead to the initial success. It was only a year and a half earlier
that sixty percent of the American public had opposed the four billion dollar
loan to the British, but by July 1947, fifty-seven percent of the mass public
supported the concept of the Marshall Plan.^^ The American public believed
in the evils of communism and accepted the Truman administration's inter
pretation that financial resources were required to stop the communist evil
in Europe. While the language, phrased in the rhetoric of devil theory, had
indeed been successful in this instance, the Truman administration's accep
tance of oversimplified rhetoric would prove to have significant conse
quences.
One major disadvantage was that the devil theory language forced the
Truman administration's rhetorical commitments to be too broad. Once the
Truman administration was forced to publicly use the language of the devil
theory to gain acceptance of its programs, it also had to accept the assump
tions that underlay the use of the rhetorical structure. Given the limitations
of the rhetorical position, policy would have to be adapted to comply with
the limitations. This acceptance would lead the Truman administration into
a broad, oversimplified policy statement which in specific terms could not
be easily understood or enacted and could not be financially supported. The
Truman administration could not just be concerned about the evils of com
munism in Greece and Turkey to comply with these assumptions. Greece
and Turkey must be seen as two examples of the Soviet threat. Truman had
to state that the United States would be committed to this immediate threat
to and all others as well.
George Kennan was one of the first administration insiders to be con
cerned about the scope of the United States commitment. As Gaddis said of
Kennan's attitude: "Although Kennan supported aid to Greece and Turkey,
he objected to placing it in the framework of a universal policy rather than
in that of a specific decision addressed to a set of specific circumstances.""^
The Truman administration had rhetorically committed the United States to
an impossible situation. Realistically the United States could not possibly
send troops or financial support to every geographic location threatened by
communism because it did not have the financial or military resources for
such a commitment. This broad rhetorical commitment doomed all United
States policy relating to the Soviet Union to failure. Since the United States
was committed to preventing the spread of communism anywhere in the
world, the spread of communism anywhere in the world was interpreted as
failure of United States foreign policy. While the generality was rhetorically
based, the political punishment for failure to achieve the level of rhetorical
generality was real. It became impossible for Truman to achieve the far-
" The Gallup Poll, September 30, 1945, Question, "Loan to England," and July 23,
1947, Question, "Marshall Plan."
Gaddis, p. 350.
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reaching scope of the commitment. The stigma of "losing a country to com
munism" would come to haunt the Truman administration.
The Truman administration was first punished for failure to achieve the
goals defined by this broad rhetorical commitment in 1949 when the Chinese
communists gained control of mainland China. Truman had pledged the
United States would "save" any country from communism anywhere on the
globe; therefore, Truman's failure to save China was indeed a failure of large
proportions, a failure with attached political punishment, resulting from the
rhetorical oversimplifications. The Truman administration was put in a de
fensive position and was never able to recover.
After the "loss of China," the Truman administration had to be ready to
react quickly at the next possible communist encroachment which came
from the North Korean Army. In 1950, when the North Korea Army crossed
the 38th parallel, Truman had to commit United States' prestige and military
power to stop the communist aggression or face the same type of political
punishment connected with the "loss of China."
While the short-term consequences of the Truman administration's accep
tance of the devil theory made passage of the Truman Doctrine and the
Marshall Plan possible, the long-term consequences were negative.
Another important factor to consider are the implications for the Truman
administration or any other presidential administration that accepts a rhetor
ical structure created by a source outside of the presidency. If a president
creates a rhetorical structure to "sell" a certain position to the mass public,
s/he must live within the restrictions of that rhetorical structure. However, if
the president created the structure s/he has greater control of the rhetorical
limitations. When a president is forced to adopt a rhetorical structure created
by an outside source, the limitations of that structure are not of his or her
creation, and therefore, can be more confining.
The important lesson to be learned here is that it is possible in some
situations for a rhetorical structure to limit policy options by limiting the
rhetorical choices that sell that policy. These limiting rhetorical structures
can become a type of "rhetorical trap," as the anti-communist press' devil
theory presentation became a "rhetorical trap" for the Truman administra
tion.
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1. Arrest of Polish underground leaders
2. Papal Message to Women
3. Reports from Estonian, Latvian and
Lithuanian Refugees
4. Mass Suicides of Estonian, Latvian and
Lithuanian Soldiers
5. Chinese Factories Looted




8. Communists Attack the Catholic
Church
9. Papal Encyclical on Ruthenian Catholic
Church
10. Stalin Announces Five Year Plan
11. Canadian Spies Caught
12. Canadian Spy Reports Continue
13. Manchuria Looted
14. Soviet Absorption of the Ruthenian
Catholic Church
15. Mihailovich Arrested
16. Vatican Charges Cruelty in Russian
Zone
17. Publication of / Chose Freedom
18. Mihailovic Trial and Execution
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20. Five American Fliers Shot Down Over
Yugoslavia August 1946
21. Soviet Purge Trials in the Ukraine September 1946
22. Animal Farm is Published September 1946
23. Arrest of Archbishop Stepinac October 1946
24. Conversion of Louis Budenz October 1946
25. C.I.O. Convention November 1946
26. Coal Strike November-December 1
27. HUAC Investigates Hollywood November-December 1
28. Kiril Alexiev Defects January 1946
29. Polish Elections January-February 1946
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